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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the automobile became commercially available
to the public at large, the problem of drinking and driving has
posed a major threat to community safety. The hazard has
been met by a variety of legislative responses over time, each
successively designed in one way or another to grapple more
effectively with a problem which prior law had failed to check.
In Wisconsin the legislature first tackled the issue of im-
paired driving' in 1911.2 Since that time the relevant laws
have been subjected to repeated alteration, 3 the most recent
overhaul occurring in the 1981-82 legislative session.4 If his-
tory is a learned teacher, its lessons translate into a forecast of
continual change in the definition of the substantive impaired
driving offenses, the procedural mechanisms for their enforce-
ment and adjudication, and the manner and method of dealing
with convicted offenders.'
The focus of this article is upon the substantive offense def-
initions in the complex of Wisconsin's impaired driving stat-
utes. After an initial study of the various relevant laws in Part
II, the discussion proceeds in Part III to an analysis of the
relationship of the several offenses as it impacts upon multiple
charge and conviction issues in cases of impaired driving.
Suggested methods of responding to certain critical problems
identified in these two sections are posited in Part IV.
1. The term "impaired driving" is employed throughout this article in a generic
way to connote driving while "under the influence" or while the actor has a blood
alcohol concentration equal to or in excess of stated statutory limits. This usage of the
term may be contrasted with legislation in other jurisdictions which classifies impaired
driving as a lesser offense of driving while intoxicated or while under the influence of
intoxicants. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1202(1)(b) (1984); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.
LAW § 1192(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
2. The original Wisconsin statute on the subject provided that "no intoxicated per-
son shall operate, ride or drive any automobile, motor cycle or other similar motor
vehicle along or upon any public highway of this state." Wis. STAT. § 1636-49 (1911).
3. Former versions of Wisconsin's impaired driving statutes which are significant in
the interpretation of the current laws are specifically referred to in the discussion and
notes which follow.
4. 1981 Wis. Laws 20, amended by 1981 Wis. Laws 184.
5. The flurry of legislative activity which this subject currently generates is evi-
denced in the present session of the Wisconsin legislature. As of December 1, 1985, the




II. THE OFFENSES AND THEIR ELEMENTS
A. OMVWI: The General Offense
The basic offense in Wisconsin's statutory scheme of im-
paired driving offenses is that of "operating while under the
influence of intoxicant or other drug" (OMVWI).6 On several
occasions the Wisconsin Supreme Court has articulated the
elements of this offense as being two in number: first, that the
defendant drove or operated a motor vehicle, and second, that
the defendant was "under the influence" or had a blood alco-
hol concentration equal to or in excess of the statutory limit at
the time of driving or operating.7 This formulation is sug-
gested by the very language of the OMVWI statute, but it
must be supplemented by the requirement that the offense be
committed upon a highway or upon premises held out to the
public for motor vehicle usage.8
6. Wis. STAT. § 346.63(1) (1983-84) provides:
(1) No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while:
(a) Under the influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance or a combi-
nation of an intoxicant and a controlled substance, under the influence of any
other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or
under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree
which renders him or her incapable of safely driving; or
(b) The person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1% or more by weight
of alcohol in that person's blood or 0.1 grams or more of alcohol in 210 liters of
that person's breath. (c) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may
proceed upon a complaint based upon a violation of par. (a) or (b) or both for
acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with
violating both pars. (a) and (b), the offenses shall be joined. If the person is
found guilty of both pars. (a) and (b) for acts arising out of the same incident or
occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for
purposes of counting convictions under ss. 343.30(lq) and 343.305. Paragraphs
(a) and (b) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the other does not
require.
The acronym "OMVWI" is used throughout this article to refer only to the basic
offense in the complex of Wisconsin's impaired driving statutes, i.e, operating under the
influence of an intoxicant or drug, contrary to Wis. STAT. § 346.63(1) (1983-84). Other
similar designations which appear in the cases and in the literature include DUI, DWI,
OAWI, and OWL. In no instance is there any reference herein to "drunken driving"
terminology because of the distortion which this language visits upon the true nature of
the offense.
7. See State v. Gaudesi, 112 Wis. 2d 213, 220, 332 N.W.2d 302, 305 (1983); State v.
Burkman, 96 Wis. 2d 630, 644, 292 N.W.2d 641, 647-48 (1980); Monroe County v.
Kruse, 76 Wis. 2d 126, 131, 250 N.W.2d 375, 377 (1977); City of Milwaukee v. John-
ston, 21 Wis. 2d 411, 414, 124 N.W.2d 690, 692 (1963).
8. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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1. The Act: "Drive/Operate" a Motor Vehicle Upon a
Highway
The first element of the general OMVWI offense requires
the prosecution to establish that the defendant drove or oper-
ated a motor vehicle. The "drive/operate" distinction and its
accompanying definitions9 were initially engrafted upon the
law in 1977.10 The statute in effect prior to that time em-
ployed the two terms interchangeably to mean "exercising
physical control over the vehicle's speed and direction while
in motion."' I This definition survives in the current version of
the statute but is limited in applicability to the term "drive."
The "drive" concept in the present law has to date posed
little interpretative difficulty." The motion requirement read-
ily identifies the threshold at which "driving" commences.
1 3
The more difficult issue has been the determination of a simi-
lar threshold by which to measure the act of "operating." The
concern is one of identifying the minimum conduct which
constitutes the statutory requirement of "physical manipula-
tion or activation of any of the controls of a motor vehicle
necessary to put it in motion."
' 1 4
9. Wis. STAT. § 346.63(3) (1983-84) provides definitions of the conduct as follows:
(3) In this section:
(a) "Drive" means the exercise of physical control over the speed and direc-
tion of a motor vehicle while it is in motion.
(b) "Operate" means the physical manipulation or activation of any of the
controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.
10. 1977 Wis. Laws 193, § 14.
11. Wis. STAT. § 346.63(4) (1975). The definition included in the 1975 version of
the statute was originally enacted in 1968. 1967 Wis. Laws 292, § 49. Prior to the 1968
change the OMVWI statutes variously identified the prohibited conduct in generic
terms without codified definitions. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 346.63(1) (1965) ("operate");
Wis. STAT. § 85.13 (1955) ("operate"); Wis. STAT. § 343.182 (1925) ("operate, ride or
drive").
12. The more common issue has traditionally been one of evidence sufficiency in
those cases lacking eyewitness testimony of the defendant's driving or an admission to
that effect and in which the prohibited conduct must be proven, if it is to be established
at all, with the use of circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 271 Wis. 450, 73
N.W.2d 585 (1955).
13. Even before the legislature initiated the practice of providing conduct defini-
tions, the OMVWI offense was understood to commence when the driver set his or her
vehicle in motion upon a highway. See City of Milwaukee v. Richards, 269 Wis. 570,
577, 69 N.W.2d 445, 448 (1955).
14. A comparison of the definition of "operating" with that of "driving" reveals
that the latter is necessarily included within the former. Nonetheless it is desirable for
the legislature to have specifically defined the act of "driving." In those cases premised
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The most instructive treatment of the "operating" concept
thus far has been provided by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
in County of Milwaukee v. Proegler.5 In this case the defend-
ant was found sleeping behind the wheel of his truck which
was parked on an emergency ramp of an interstate highway.
The engine was running and the transmission shift lever was
in the "park" position. The court held that this conduct con-
stituted "operating." 16 It anchored its analysis in the legisla-
tive policy of discouraging individuals who are "under the
influence" from initially getting behind the wheel. "One who
enters a vehicle while intoxicated, and does nothing more than
start the engine is as much of a threat to himself and the pub-
lic as one who actually drives while intoxicated." 17 The stat-
ute was held to reach conduct such as Proegler's because
"operation" occurs when the engine is started or left on to
run.18 It may also occur when a driver restrains the move-
ment of a vehicle while its engine is running.19
While starting the engine or allowing the motor to run
may serve as useful benchmarks by which to identify "opera-
tion" under the statute, the question remains whether that be-
havior constitutes the minimum conduct level at which
liability attaches.20 Situations are indeed conceivable in which
an impaired driver activates an essential control of the vehicle
upon evidence that the defendant actually exercised control over a vehicle in motion, a
charge of "driving" furnishes precise notice to the accused regarding the theory of the
prosecution. This is not to suggest, however, that notice is deficient or the pleading
defective if a "driver" is charged as an "operator" because driving a motor vehicle is
encompassed definitionally by the term "operate."
15. 95 Wis. 2d 614, 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980).
16. The court reached this conclusion even though the defendant was asleep at the
time of operation and had no present intent to move the vehicle. An intent to drive is
not an element of the OMVWI offense. Id. at 628, 291 N.W.2d at 614.
17. Id. at 626, 291 N.W.2d at 613. The court specifically recognized the danger
that one who starts the engine may thereafter intentionally or accidentally move the
vehicle. Id.
18. Id. at 628-29, 291 N.W.2d at 614.
19. Id. at 627-28, 291 N.W.2d at 614.
20. In the vast majority of cases which involve no-movement "operation" of vehi-
cles, the dangerous conduct of the impaired operator is usefully identified in connection
with his activation of the motor. See, e.g., Village of Elkhart Lake v. Borzyskowski, 123
Wis. 2d 185, 366 N.W.2d 506 (Ct. App. 1985) (impaired driver seated behind the wheel
of a parked vehicle with the engine running held to be an "operator"); State v. Byrtek,
No. 83-1716 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 1984) (unpublished opinion available on LEXIS,
Wisconsin library, Cases file) (impaired driver seated behind the wheel with the engine
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under circumstances in which that conduct poses a present
danger to public safety even though the engine of the vehicle is
not activated.21 Such conduct would appear to qualify as "op-
eration" under the statutory definition. Accordingly, it is sug-
gested that a more precise formulation of the threshold of
"operation" would be conduct which involves starting the ve-
hicle's engine, allowing it to run, or activating any control
short of engine ignition which might allow the vehicle to
move, albeit accidentally.22
running and the transmission shift lever in "reverse," but involving no movement of the
vehicle because it was stuck in the mud, held to constitute "operation").
Like several additional cases cited in the notes which follow, Byrtek is an unpub-
lished opinion issued by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Such opinions have no prece-
dential value and may not be cited as authority in any Wisconsin court except to
support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case. WIs. STAT.
§ 809.23(3) (1983-84). Unpublished opinions are referred to in the materials which fol-
low only in those instances in which the decisions contribute some additional insight
into the interpretation and application of the impaired driving statutes hereunder
consideration.
21. A simple illustration demonstrates the point. The intoxicated individual whose
vehicle is parked on a steep incline enters the car, puts the key into the ignition switch,
engages the clutch, places the gear shift lever in the "neutral" position and restrains the
vehicle from rolling down the incline by activating the brake pedal. Even though the
individual has not started the engine, he has nevertheless activated several of the con-
trols necessary to put the vehicle in motion. It is submitted that this conduct is included
within the statutory definition of "operating."
22. The practical reality is that in most prosecutions the defendant's conduct rather
clearly falls within the "drive/operate" definitions. This is not meant to suggest, how-
ever, that the formulation of separate definitions has not had a significant impact upon
the OMVWI law.
In the first instance, the enactment of the present definition of "operate" expanded
the coverage of the prior statute such that it now reaches certain dangerous conduct
which may occur either before the vehicle is put in motion or after it has been moved.
Second, the codification of the present definition of "operate" has furthered the interest
of the prosecution in admitting the results of chemical tests for intoxication. Wis.
STAT. § 885.235(1) (1983-84) allows for the receipt of such test results as proof of the
defendant's condition (without expert testimony to establish their probative value) if the
test is conducted within three hours of the driving or operation of the vehicle. Prior to
the development of the expanded statutory definition of "operate," the calculation of
the time period (formerly two hours) commenced at the point at which the evidence
demonstrated that the vehicle was last in motion. This posed no problem when a police
officer or other witness personally observed the driving. The more difficult situation
was that in which the officer discovered the defendant passed out behind the wheel
while the engine was running, but could not establish with any precision when the vehi-
cle was last in motion. Under present law, the latter scenario poses no time issue be-
cause the officer has actually witnessed an act of "operating" and the three-hour period
commences to run from that moment forward. However, even under the current liberal
definition of "operating," a calculation problem may nonetheless exist in those cases
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In addition to proving that the defendant's conduct consti-
tuted "driving" or "operating," the evidence in an OMYWI
case must also demonstrate that the accused engaged in that
conduct in a "motor vehicle." This term connotes self-pro-
pelled devices in, upon or by which persons or property may
be transported or drawn upon a highway.3 Snowmobiles and
railroad trains are excluded from coverage 24 as are convey-
ances which are not self-propelled, such as bicycles and
animal-drawn vehicles.
Finally, it should be observed that enforcement of the
OMVWI statute is limited to those instances of motor vehicle
driving or operation which occur on highways26 or upon
"premises held out to the public for use of their motor vehi-
which involve a lapse of time between the last provable act of "driving" or "operating"
and the discovery of the driver or operator.
23. Wis. STAT. § 340.01(74) (1983-84) provides: "'Vehicle' means every device in,
upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a
highway, except railroad trains. A snowmobile shall not be considered a vehicle except
for purposes made specifically applicable by statute."
"To be a vehicle it need not be transporting a person or property at the time.
but only that it be capable of such transportation on a highway." Lemon v. Federal Ins.
Co., 111 Wis. 2d 563, 567, 331 N.W.2d 379, 381 (1983).
Wis. STAT. § 340.01(35) provides: "'Motor Vehicle' means a vehicle which is self-
propelled, including a trackless trolley bus, except that a snowmobile shall only be con-
sidered a motor vehicle for purposes made specifically applicable by statute."
The meaning of "motor vehicle," as suggested in the text accompanying this note, is
obtained by synthesizing the two statutory provisions quoted above.
24. See supra note 23.
25. "The term 'motor vehicle' is used [in the Vehicle Code] when the purpose is to
exclude animal drawn vehicles and vehicles propelled by human power." Wisconsin
Legislative Council note to 1957 S.B. 99, § 340.01(35) (1957). On the other hand, the
term "vehicle" is used in the Vehicle Code "whereever broad coverage is desired." Id.
at § 340.01(74).
The discussion in the accompanying text is not meant to imply that the legislature
has ignored the problem of the impaired driving of other vehicles which are not within
the scope of the OMVWI law. See, eg., Wis. STAT. § 30.68 (1983-84) (motorboats); id.
at § 114.09 (aircraft); id. at § 350.10(3) (snowmobiles).
26. Wis. STAT. § 340.01(22) (1983-84) provides the relevant definition of
"highway":
"Highway" means all public ways and thoroughfares and bridges on the
same. It includes the entire width between the boundary lines of every way open
to the use of the public as a matter of right for the purposes of vehicular travel.
It includes those roads or driveways in the state, county or municipal parks and
in state forests which have been opened to the use of the public for the purpose of
vehicular travel and roads or driveways upon the grounds of institutions under
the jurisdiction of the county board of supervisors, but does not include private
roads or driveways as defined in sub.(46).
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des, whether such premises are publicly or privately owned
and whether or not a fee is charged for the use thereof."27 The
highway limitation is consistent with the general applicability
of the Rules of the Road2 to offenses occurring upon high-
ways.29 The expansion of coverage to premises held out for
public use of motor vehicles is designed to address the special
public safety concerns associated with the OMVWI offense.30
See In the Interest of E.J.H., 112 Wis. 2d 439, 334 N.W.2d 77 (1983) (construing the
statutory definition of "highway" to include the entire right-of-way).
The definition of "highway" quoted above specifically excludes "private roads and
driveways" as those terms are defined in Wis. STAT. § 340.01(46) (1983-84). The latter
statute provides:
"Private road or driveway" is every way or place in private ownership and
used for vehicular travel only by the owner and those having express or implied
permission from the owner and every road or driveway upon the grounds of
public institutions other than those under the jurisdiction of the county board of
supervisors.
27. Wis. STAT. § 346.61 (1983-84). The court of appeals has stated as follows:
Premises may be held out to the public either expressly or impliedly. Prem-
ises are expressly held open to the public where the proprietor actually invites
members of the public to use the premises. Premises are impliedly held out to
the public for the use of their motor vehicles if such premises are ordinarily and
regularly used by the public for their motor vehicles. . . .[Section 346.61] re-
quires only that the premises be held out to some class of the public, not all of
the public.
State v. Wetchen, No. 82-1925-CR (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1983)(unpublished opinion
available on LEXIS, Wisconsin library, Cases file). In State v. Biddick, No. 85-0807
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 1985) (unpublished opinion available on LEXIS, Wisconsin
library, Cases file) an apartment parking lot was held to constitute premises covered by
section 346.61. Even though the lot was posted to prohibit parking by nonresidents,
such signs did not prohibit the public from driving in or out of the lot to pick up or drop
off passengers nor did they prohibit such other common uses for which the invitation to
enter was implicit. A similar result was reached in State v. Vail, No. 84-147 (Wis. Ct.
App. May 25, 1984) (unpublished opinion available on LEXIS, Wisconsin library,
Cases file), wherein the parking lot of a forty-eight unit apartment complex was held to
be premises covered by section 346.61. The lot's nature, size and location necessarily
implied that residents, guests, invitees, service personnel, delivery persons and others
would use the lot. This variety of uses coupled with the absence of any evidence of
restricted access by signs or gates led the court to conclude that the premises were held
out for public use. See also State v. Peterson, No. 83-861 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1983)
(unpublished opinion available on LEXIS, Wisconsin library, Cases file) (holding that
the roadway of a trailer court was a place held out to the public for motor vehicle
usage); Wisconsin Legislative Council note to 1957 S.B. 99, § 346.61 (1957) ("[Section
346.61] will apply in such areas as parking lots, filling stations and loading platforms.");
65 Op. AT'Y GEN. 45, 46 (1976) (OMVWI law enforceable upon public parking lots
under authority of section 346.61).
28. Wis. STAT. ch. 346 (1983-84).
29. Id. at § 346.02(1).
30. Wisconsin Legislative Council note to 1957 S.B. 99, § 346.61 (1957).
[Vol. 69:165
OFFENSE DEFINITION
2. The Condition of the Operator
The second element of the general OMVWI offense con-
cerns the condition of the driver (as opposed to the driver's
act). It is expressed alternatively as the condition of being
"under the influence" 31 or the status of having a quantifiable
chemical concentration of alcohol in the blood or breath
which equals or exceeds the statutory limit.32 These alterna-
tive definitions represent dual theories of liability and confront
the driver with the possibility of ultimately defending against
multiple charges.33
a. "Under the Influence" A Condition of Impairment
The OMVWI statute identifies a total of five "influenced"
conditions which, if accompanied by the requisite act, may
subject a person to prosecution.34 Three of these conditions
are described without a statutory definition of the extent to
which the driver must be impaired; the other two are phrased
in a manner somewhat descriptive of the condition intended
by the legislature.
In the category of conditions identified as to source but
unaccompanied by definition as to degree of impairment, one
may not drive or operate a motor vehicle if that conduct oc-
curs while "under the influence" of an intoxicant, 35 a con-
31. Wis. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a) (1983-84).
32. Id. at § 346.63(1)(b).
33. Id. at § 346.63(l)(c). See also infra notes 168-177 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 6.
35. The Vehicle Code provides no definition of "intoxicant," nor does it specifically
import a definition from other statutory sources. In the absence of such, the common
and approved usage of nontechnical words and phrases contained in a statute is pre-
sumed to be the usage intended by the legislature. State v. Ehlenfeldt, 94 Wis. 2d 347,
356, 288 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1980). The meaning may be established with dictionary
definitions. See,e.g., State v. Mauthe, 123 Wis. 2d 288, 298, 366 N.W.2d 871, 876
(1985) (standard Engligh language dictionary employed). One such definition of "in-
toxicant" is "an agent that intoxicates; especially, an alcoholic beverage." AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 686 (1980). The same source
thereafter defines "intoxicate" as "[tlo induce, especially by the effect of ingested alco-
hol, any of a series of progressively deteriorating states ranging from exhilaration to
stupefaction." Id.
While most intoxicant cases involve those who have consumed traditional alcoholic
"spirits" (beer, wine or liquor), the occasional situation presents itself in which the actor
has sniffed such substances as model glue to the point of being "under the influence"
thereof. Under a liberal definition of the term "intoxicant," which includes but is not
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trolled substance,36 or a combination of an intoxicant and a
controlled substance.3 7 The precise meaning of "under the in-
fluence" is the subject of some contemporary dispute. In State
v. Waalen,38 which represents the most recent treatment of the
issue, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that an instruction
which informed the jury that "under the influence of an intox-
icant" covers "any abnormal mental or physical conditions
which is [sic] the result of indulging in any degree in intoxicat-
ing liquors, including beer, which tends to deprive one of that
clearness of intellect and self-control which one would other-
wise possess," fully and fairly stated the test by which the pro-
scribed condition is gauged.39 The court cast the standard at
something less than the "material impairment of ability to
limited to traditional alcoholic beverages, the model glue may be deemed an influence
source recognized by the OMVWI law.
36. Wis. STAT. § 340.01(9m) (1983-84) incorporates the Uniform Controlled Sub-
stances Act, Wis. STAT. ch. 161 (1983-84), definition of "controlled substance" into the
Vehicle Code. The term means any "drug, substance or immediate precursor" which is
classified in sections 161.14 through 161.22 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
37. This combination provision was added to the general OMVWI statute to clarify
what was evidently perceived to be a potential loophole in a predecessor version of the
law. The prior statute provided that it was unlawful to drive or operate a motor vehicle
"while under the influence of an intoxicant or controlled substance." Wis. STAT.
§ 346.63(1) (1979-80). Conditions involving the combined use of an intoxicant and a
controlled substance had to be resolved by analogy to the principles explicated in City
of Waukesha v. Godfrey, 41 Wis. 2d 401, 164 N.W.2d 314 (1969). See infra note 55 and
accompanying text. If indeed there was a gap in coverage, it was remedied by the spe-
cific inclusion of the combination intoxicant-controlled substance provision in section
346.63(1)(a). 1981 Wis. Laws 20, § 1598t.
38. 125 Wis. 2d 272, 274, 371 N.W.2d 401, 402 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). In an order
dated Oct. 8, 1985, the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted a petition to review this
decision.
39. The trial court in Waalen departed from the uniform jury instruction which
informs the jury that "under the influence" means that "the person's ability to safely
control his vehicle be materially, that is substantially, impaired." Wis. JI-Criminal 2663
(1982). The quoted standard employed in the pattern instruction is derived from Wis.
STAT. § 939.22(42) (1983-84) which provides a definition of "under the influence of an
intoxicant" for purposes of Criminal Code offenses as follows:
"Under the influence of an intoxicant" means that the actor's ability to oper-
ate a vehicle or handle a firearm or airgun is materially impaired because of his
or her consumption of an alcohol beverage or controlled substance under ch. 161
or both, of any other drug or of an alcohol beverage and any other drug.
See Wis. JI-Criminal 2663 comment 6 (1982).
While this definition necessarily applies to criminal offenses under the provisions of
Wis. STAT. § 939.20 (1983-84), its applicability to the general OMVWI statute (a Vehi-
cle Code offense) was rejected by the Waalen court: "Proof of a 'material'or 'substan-
tial' impairment in the defendant's ability to drive is therefore not a requirement for
[Vol. 69:165
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drive" threshold which is applied by legislative mandate to
companion offenses codified in the Criminal Code.4' Its con-
clusion was ostensibly premised upon a series of Wisconsin
appellate opinions holding that the general OMVWI statute
does not require proof of appreciable interference in the man-
agement of a motor vehicle.41 The latter authorities, however,
more pointedly address the question of whether the operator's
condition must be evidenced by appreciable interference, e.g.,
erratic driving, and squarely hold that it does not. Such de-
convicting a person of driving under the influence." 125 Wis. 2d at 275, 371 N.W.2d at
403.
The instruction actually given by the trial court in Waalen parallels a prior version
of the uniform jury instruction defining "under the influence." Id. at 274, 371 N.W.2d
at 402. The language contained therein, which is quoted in the accompanying text, set
the standard of impairment in a manner consistent with that urged by one commentator
as the recognized Wisconsin test:
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, as well as almost all other supreme courts in
the country, has defined the term "under the influence of intoxicants" on numer-
ous occasions and has held that the condition covers not only all the well known
and easily recognized conditions and the degrees of intoxication but any abnor-
mal mental or physical condition which is the result of indulging, in any degree,
in intoxicating liquors and which tends to deprive him of that clearness of intel-
lect and control of himself which he would otherwise possess.
Sullivan, Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor - Proof Prosecution and
Defenses, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 195, 199. No citation of authority accompanies this pas-
sage. However, the author served as appellate counsel in one of the leading cases to
address the elements of the general OMVWI offense. City of Milwaukee v. Richards,
269 Wis. 570, 69 N.W.2d 445 (1955). His brief for that case cites numerous cases from
other jurisdictions which have applied the standard of "under the influence" referred to
in his law review article. Brief for Respondent at 24-33, City of Milwaukee v. Richards,
269 Wis. 570, 69 N.W.2d 445 (1955). See, eg., Hasten v. State, 35 Ariz- 427, 280 P. 670
(1929); State v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. 212, 102 A. 433 (1917); Commonwealth v. Buoy,
128 Pa. Super. 264, 193 A. 144 (1937). The same standard was also applied by the trial
court in the Richards case. Brief for Appellant at app. 102-05, City of Milwaukee v.
Richards, 269 Wis. 570, 69 N.W.2d 445 (1955).
In City of Fond du Lac v. Hernandez, 42 Wis. 2d 473, 167 N.W.2d 408 (1969), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed jury instructions relative to the definition of "under
the influence" which were similar to those given in Waalen. In its affirnance of the
conviction, the court rejected a contention of the defense that the jury should have been
told that the degree of influence "must be such as to affect the defendant's ability to
drive with due regard for the safety of others." Hernandez, 42 Wis. 2d at 477, 167
N.W.2d at 410.
See also 1 R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES § 1.04[2] (3d ed. 1985)
(survey of the various interpretations which the courts in other jurisdictions have affixed
to "under the influence" terminology).
40. See Wis. STAT. § 940.09 (1983-84) (homicide by intoxicated user of vehicle or
firearm); id. at § 940.25 (injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle).
41. See, eg., State v. Gaudesi, 112 vis. 2d 213, 221, 332 N.W.2d 302, 305 (1983);
City of Milwaukee v. Richards, 269 Wis. 570, 576-77, 69 N.W.2d 445, 448 (1955).
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monstrable interference with the operation and control of the
vehicle is not an element of the OMVWI offense,42 although
evidence thereof may certainly be probative of the defendant's
impaired condition.43
Notwithstanding the authorities relied upon in Waalen, a
problem of definition remains with reference to identifying
with any precision the state of being "under the influence."
Most assuredly the phrase connotes a degree of impairment
short of outright intoxication. 44 It has also been described as
"considerably less" than the degree of intoxication which
would render a person incapable of understanding and volun-
tarily waiving his constitutional rights.45 While these proposi-
tions are instructive in explaining what "under the influence"
is not, they are inadequate in clarifying precisely what the
condition is.
One resolution of the issue is suggested by referring in the
first instance to the statutes defining the evidentiary signifi-
cance of chemical test results. Section 885.235(1)(c) of the
Wisconsin Statutes provides that an analysis showing a per-
son's blood alcohol concentration at 0.10% or more by
42. Richards, 269 Wis. at 576-77, 69 N.W.2d at 448.
43. Gaudesi, 112 Wis. 2d at 221, 332 N.W.2d at 305; State v. Hanson, Nos. 84-
1387-CR and 84-1388-CR (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 1985) (unpublished opinion avail-
able on LEXIS, Wisconsin libarary, Cases file); State v. Maki, No. 82-327 (Wis. Ct.
App. June 8, 1982) (unpublished opinion available on LEXIS, Wisconsin library, Cases
file).
44. The drunken-driving law as originally enacted, and up to 1929, employed
the phrase "while intoxicated" to describe a person coming under its provisions.
In 1929, the legislature, by ch. 454, Laws of 1929, repealed the old statute and
created in its stead sec. 85.13, Stats. In the language of the new statute, a person
is prohibited from operating any vehicle upon any highway "while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor." This change indicates that the legislature, with
increasing awareness of the importance of safety in the operation of dangerous
instruments on the highway, extended the prohibitions from persons who would
come under the restricted category of absolute intoxication to those persons
whose reactions would show that they were merely "under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor."
Richards, 269 Wis. at 575, 69 N.W.2d at 447-48.
45. State v. Paegelow, 56 Wis. 2d 815, 820, 202 N.W.2d 916, 918 (1973). This
proposition is especially significant in those cases in which the prosecution claims that
the accused was "under the influence" but was nevertheless capable of understanding




weight 46 is prima facie evidence that the individual is "under
the influence of an intoxicant." This statute is expressly appli-
cable in any action or proceeding in which it is material to
prove that condition.47 Commenting on a predecessor version
of section 885.235, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that
the provision was enacted in response to the difficulty encoun-
tered by the courts in establishing the degree of intoxication
prohibited by the OMVWI law and was designed to clarify the
meaning of "under the influence. "48
In the context of Criminal Code offenses involving the
causation of death 49 or great bodily harm50 by driving while
"under the influence," that condition is defined as one of ma-
terial impairment of the ability to operate a vehicle.5 1 By ap-
plication of section 885.235 to these statutes, a chemical test
result of 0.10% blood alcohol is prima facie evidence of that
degree of intoxication which would constitute such material
impairment. But section 885.235 also applies to the OMVWI
statute and 0.10% is prima facie evidence of the degree of in-
toxication which constitutes "under the influence" for the lat-
ter offense as well. If identical chemical test results constitute
prima facie evidence of the proscribed condition in both con-
texts, a compelling argument may be made that the legislature
intended the meaning of "under the influence" to be
equivalent in both contexts.52 If the latter premise is correct,
46. An alternative formulation of the standard is 0.1 grams or more of alcohol in
210 liters of the breath. Wis. STAT. § 885.235(l)(c) (1983-84).
47. Id. at § 885.235(1).
48. 269 Wis. at 576, 69 N.W.2d at 448. The predecessor version of section 885.235
to which the Richards court referred was Wis. STAT. § 85.13(2) (1951). The latter pro-
vision was initially enacted in 1949. 1949 Wis. Laws 534. It was codified as part of the
then-existing general OMVWI law and was applicable upon the trial of any action or
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person arrested for
operating a motor vehicle while "under the influence." This chemical test statute was
thereafter replaced by Wis. STAT. § 325.235 (1955). See 1955 Wis. Laws 510. The
replacement statute (like the present section 885.235) was made specifically applicable
to any action or proceeding in which it was material to prove that an actor was "under
the influence." Id. An argument may be made that the legislature thereby sought to
establish a definition of the condition which would serve as a uniform threshold of im-
pairment throughout the impaired driving statutes.
49. Wis. STAT. § 940.09 (1983-84).
50. Id. at § 940.25.
51. Id. at § 939.22(42).
52. Although the court of appeals in Waalen rejected the applicability of the Crimi-
nal Code threshold of impairment to the general OMVWI offense, it did indicate that
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then the threshold of "influence," defined in the criminal stat-
utes as material impairment of ability to operate a vehicle,
would accordingly be applicable to the general OMVWI of-
fense as well.53 Under the general OMVWI statute, the "ma-
terial impairment" definition would then pertain without
regard to whether the defendant's condition was caused by the
the variance in standards is an "illogical distinction" but left the matter to legislative
resolution. Waalen, 125 Wis. 2d at 275, 371 N.W.2d at 403.
The Criminal Code definition of "under the influence" emanated from the enact-
ment of that Code in 1955. It is interesting to note that when the Criminal Code Advi-
sory Committee (see infra note 107) discussed the Code's definition of the standard of
impairment, a motion was made to amend the language of the definition such that it
would be applicable to Code offenses as well as to the general OMVWI law. The mo-
tion failed to carry but the committee chair, Hon. Gerald J. Boileau, "asked that the
minutes show that the consensus of the committee was that there should be uniformity
in the definition of the term 'under the influence of an intoxicant' in this code as well as
Chapter 85 [Vehicle Code]." Minutes of the Criminal Code Advisory Committee at 7
(July 22, 1955). The committee thereupon directed that this matter be referred to an-
other committee which was working on Vehicle Code revisions. Id.
The Wisconsin Legislative Council's Motor Vehicle Laws Committee initially ac-
cepted this suggestion from the Criminal Code Advisory Committee and proposed to
incorporate the Criminal Code definition of "under the influence" into the general
OMVWI statute. See Wisconsin Legislative Council Second Preliminary Report of the
Motor Vehicle Laws Committee at 80 (Sept. 1956); Minutes of the Motor Vehicle Laws
Committee at 10 (May 18-19, 1956). The committee subsequently struck the definition
from its report when a disagreement developed as to whether the language would effec-
tuate a change in the meaning of the general OMVWI statute. See Wisconsin Legisla-
tive Council Supplement to First and Second Preliminary Reports of the Motor Vehicle
Laws Committee at 18 (Dec. 1956); Minutes of the Motor Vehicle Laws Committee at 2
(Nov. 8, 1956). No such definition was included in the legislation which was based
upon the Council's report and which served as the genesis for the present Vehicle Code.
1957 Wis. Laws 260.
53. This conclusion would pertain to any case without regard to whether the de-
fendant submitted to chemical testing. In the context of this discussion the chemical
test statute is significant only because it establishes an equivalency of the "under the
influence" definition in the Criminal Code with that in the general OMVWI statute.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court seemed to assume such an equivalency in State v.
Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d 587, 363 N.W.2d 574 (1985). Although the meaning of "under
the influence" was not the issue in this case, the court in essence characterized the
principal difference between the general OMVWI offense as the principal difference be-
tween the general OMVWI offense and the Criminal Code homicide by intoxicated user
offense as being the causation of death, an element of the latter crime:
It is negligence per se to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicants. Experience has established this conclusion and the legislature has
accepted it as a fact in see. 346.63(l)(a), Stats., and has made such combined
activities a Class D felony when the operation of the vehicle results in death in
sec. 940.09(1)(a).
Id. at 595, 363 N.W.2d at 578.
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ingestion of an intoxicant, a controlled substance or a combi-
nation of an intoxicant and a controlled substance.
In addition to these sources of impairment, the statute also
prohibits driving or operating while under the influence of any
other drug54 or under the combined influence of an intoxicant
and any other drug.55 In the latter two situations, however,
the language of section 346.63(l)(a) itself suggests the degree
of influence intended by the legislature. The threshold is cast
in terms of being under the influence "to a degree which ren-
ders [the driver or operator] incapable of safely driving." The
"safe driving" standard 56 applicable to those who have con-
sumed drugs or a combination of an intoxicant and a drug is
54. In both the Criminal Code and the Vehicle Code, the term "drug" has the
meaning specified therefor in Wis. STAT. § 450.06 (1983-84). Id. at §§ 340.01(15mm),
939.22(11). Id. at § 450.06 provides:
The term "drug," as used in this chapter, means:
(1) Articles recognized in the official U.S. Pharmacopoeia, official Homeo-
pathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or
any supplement to any of them, intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitiga-
tion, treatment or prevention of disease in persons or other animals; and
(2) All other articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment or prevention of disease in persons or other animals; and
(3) Articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function
of the body of persons or other animals; and
(4) Articles intended for use as a component of any articles specified in subs.
(1), (2) or (3); but does not include surgical, dental or laboratory instruments,
gases, oxygen therapy equipment, X-ray apparatus, or therapeutic lamps, their
components, parts or accessories; or equipment, instruments, apparatus, or con-
trivances used to render such articles effective in medical, surgical or dental
treatment; or articles intended for use or consumption in or for mechanical, in-
dustrial, manufacturing, or scientific applications or purposes.
55. Provisions relating to driving under the influence of any other drug (a drug
other than a controlled substance) or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and
any other drug were added to the general OMVWI law by 1983 Wis. Laws 459.
The enactment of a special provision to deal with one who is under the combined
influence of an intoxicant and a drug codified a theory of impairment which had previ-
ously been developed in the case law. In City of Waukesha v. Godfrey, 41 WVis. 2d 401,
406, 164 N.W.2d 314, 316 (1969), the court indicated that "[a] person who consumes an
intoxicant along with medication, does so at his own peril." The court found additional
support for this position in language excerpted from Commonwealth v. Rex, 168 Pa.
Super. 628, 632, 82 A.2d 315, 317 (1951): "If liquor shares its influence with another
influence and is still the activating cause of the condition which the statute denounces it
can be truthfully said that the driver was under the influence of liquor." See also State
v. Nachreiner, Nos. 84-787-CR and 84-788-CR (Vis. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1984) (unpub-
lished opinion available on LEXIS, Wisconsin library, Cases file).
56. The focus of this standard remains upon the condition of the driver. There is no
evidence in the statute or in the legislative history that the condition manifest itself in
acts of unsafe driving. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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the same as that employed in the Uniform Vehicle Code.57
The incorporation of this standard for a limited number of
influence sources, however, suggests an inquiry relative to the
location of this degree of influence on the continuum of im-
pairment. Is it conceptually the same as the "material impair-
ment" standard which is certainly applicable to Criminal
Code offenses and arguably applicable to other influenced con-
ditions codified only commas away in the general OMVWI
statute,58 or does it constitute an entirely different degree of
impairment?
It is apparent that when these drug and intoxicant-drug
combination provisions were added to the law, the purpose
was to eliminate perceived loopholes in statutory coverage. 9
The 1984 amendment which effectuated the addition of these
influence sources was unaccompanied by any modification of
the nonstatutory statement of legislative findings and purpose
which was enacted as part of the general overhaul of the im-
paired driving laws in 1981-82.6o Among other things, that
statement indicates a recognition of the danger to public
safety which is posed by the impaired driver and a legislative
purpose to maximize highway safety by providing sufficient
penalties to deter motor vehicle operation by those who are
"intoxicated. ' 61 The OMVWI penalty statute to which this
statement refers is uniform in nature and outlines a range of
punishment for driving while in the impaired condition with-
out differentiating among the substances or combinations
thereof which generate the condition.6 2 If the hazard with
which all provisions of section 346.63(l)(a) are designed to
cope is the same regardless of the substance involved and if
the creation of that hazard is punishable in a uniform way,
then it may be argued that the legislature intended the thresh-
old by which the condition of being "under the influence" is
defined be uniform throughout the OMVWI law. It makes
little sense to apply one standard of impairment when the
driver has consumed an intoxicant, a controlled substance or a
57. UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 11-902(a)3-4 (Supp. III 1979).
58. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
59. But see supra note 55.
60. 1981 Wis. Laws 20, § 2051(13), amended by 1981 Wis. Laws 184, § 10.
61. Id.
62. Wis. STAT. § 346.65(2) (1983-84).
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combination of the two and to apply a qualitatively different
standard when the consumption involves a drug or a mixture
of a drug and an intoxicant. However, at the present time it
remains an open question in Wisconsin whether the safe driv-
ing standard has a significance which is different from other
degrees of influence.63
b. The Chemical Offense. " 10"
The 1981-82 revision of the OMVWI statutes also wit-
nessed Wisconsin joining the growing number of jurisdic-
tions 4 which have expanded their alcohol-related driving laws
to include a chemical offense.65 A basis of liability independ-
ent of the "under the influence" provision was thereby cre-
ated, founded upon driving or operating a motor vehicle with
a specified concentration of blood or breath alcohol." In a
prosecution premised upon the chemical offense, the issues are
twofold: first, whether the defendant drove or operated a mo-
tor vehicle upon a highway (or upon premises held out to the
public for motor vehicle usage), and second, whether the per-
son had the statutorily identified alcohol content in his blood
or breath67 at the time of driving or operating.68 Liability at-
63. City of Fond du Lac v. Hernandez, 42 Wis. 2d 473, 167 N.W.2d 408 (1969),
discussed at supra note 39, was decided prior to the amendment of the general OMVWI
statute which incorporated the safe driving standard for limited sources of impairment,
such as drugs and the combination of drugs and intoxicants.
The Criminal Code definition of "under the influence" also recognizes drugs and the
combination of alcohol and drugs as influence sources. However, it does not modify
these sources with any safe driving language. Thus, a uniform standard of impairment
exists for all influence sources in the Criminal Code. Wis. STAT. § 939.22(42) (1983-
84).
64. See 3 R. ERWIN, supra note 39, ch. 33A app. (1985) (analysis of the various
state versions of "illegal per se" laws).
65. The chemical offense is also known as an "illegal per se law" or as a ".10 abso-
lute law." Id. at § 33A.00.
66. Wis. STAT. § 346.63(1)(b) (1983-84).
67. The chemical offense statute refers only to alcohol concentration in the blood or
breath. If the case involves the testing of a urine sample, the statutes provide a conver-
sion ratio for correlating urine alcohol concentration with blood alcohol concentration.
Wis. STAT. § 885.235(2) (1983-84).
68. Id. at § 885.235(3) provides for the admissibility of chemical test evidence if the
sample of breath, blood or urine is obtained within three hours of the event to be
proved. However, this section does not preclude the receipt of other competent evi-
dence bearing upon the issue of alcohol concentration in the defendant's body at the
time of driving or operating. Id. at § 885.235(4).
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taches to this conduct irrespective of the degree to which the
driver's condition or ability to drive is influenced or impaired.
The chemical offense statutes throughout the United
States have been subjected to constitutional attack on the
ground that they constitute impermissibly vague enactments.
Stated more precisely, the challenge has been that the laws are
obscure and require persons of common intelligence to specu-
late as to the point at which their blood alcohol concentration
equals or exceeds the statutory limit.
69
In Wisconsin, this constitutional attack upon the statute
was advanced in State v. Muehlenberg.7 ° In its analysis of the
issue, the court of appeals recognized that, as a practical mat-
ter, a given individual may have no way of determining with
any degree of precision, when his or her blood alcohol level
reaches the statutory limit.71 Nonetheless, it held that one
who consumes a significant amount of alcoholic beverages will
know "with a fair degree of definiteness"72 that he or she is in
jeopardy of violating the statute. "[A]ny person with com-
mon sense will know when consumption is approaching a
meaningful amount. ' 73 Accordingly, the court found that the
due process requirement of fair warning was satisfied by the
.10 law.74
The other principal evil inherent in vague statutes is the
potential they hold for discriminatory enforcement due to a
lack of standards to guide the enforcement and adjudication
69. "As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal stat-
ute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can un-
derstand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement." Kolendar v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983).
See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); State v. Popanz, 112
Wis. 2d 166, 172-73, 332 N.W.2d 750, 753-54 (1983).
70. 118 Wis. 2d 502, 347 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1984).
71. Id. at 508, 347 N.W.2d at 916.
72. The "fair degree of definiteness" standard was the test employed by the court in
resolving Muehlenberg's attack upon the statute. Id. at 508, 347 N.W.2d at 917. See
also W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 11, at 83-89 (1972).
73. Muehlenberg, 118 Wis. 2d at 509, 347 N.W.2d at 917.
74. The"lack of fair warning" attack was rejected because the court found that a
person can know when consumption of alcohol is significant and approaching a mean-
ingful amount. Id. at 508-09, 347 N.W.2d at 917. It is submitted, however, that this
analysis of the due process attack in no way imports any kind of subjective mental
element into the statute itself.
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processes. 75 This attack was also rejected in Muehlenberg be-
cause the .10 law does indeed provide a precise standard, i.e.,
0.10% of alcohol by weight in the blood, by which the police
and the courts may be guided in the discharge of their respec-
tive responsibilities.76
B. Offenses Involving Death and Great Bodily Harm
Two impaired driving offenses are codified among the pro-
visions of the Wisconsin Criminal Code. Homicide by intoxi-
cated user of a motor vehicle77 proscribes causing the death of
another78 by the operation of a vehicle either while under the
influence of an intoxicant or while the driver has a blood alco-
hol concentration equal to or in excess of the 0.10% statutory
limit. The felony injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle stat-
ute79 addresses like behavior but applies when the result is the
causation of great bodily harm to another human being.
While the structure of these two statutes rather closely paral-
75. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972).
76. Muehlenberg, 118 Wis. 2d at 507, 347 N.W.2d at 916.
The manner in which the Muehlenberg court resolved the void-for-vagueness chal-
lenge to the .10 law is consistent with the approach taken by appellate courts in several
other jurisdictions which have per se laws. See, eg., Fuenning v. Superior Court, 139
Ariz. 590, 680 P.2d 121 (1983); Lovell v. State, 283 Ark. 425, 678 S.W.2d 318 (1984);
Burg v. Municipal Court, 35 Cal. 3d 257, 673 P.2d 732, 198 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2337 (1984); Roberts v. State, 329 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1976); Greaves v.
State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974); State v. Franco, 96 Wash. 2d 816, 639 P.2d 1320
(1982).
77. Wis. STAT. § 940.09 (1983-84) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who does either of the following under par. (a) or (b) is
guilty of a Class D felony:
(a) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle,
firearm or airgun and while under the influence of an intoxicant;
(b) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle,
firearm or airgun while the person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1% or
more by weight of alcohol in that person's blood or 0.1 grams or more of alcohol
in 210 liters of that person's breath.
78. It may be observed that the result element of section 940.09 is phrased in terms
of causing the "death of another." This language is different from that employed in
other Wisconsin homicide statutes which describe the result element in terms of causing
the "death of another human being." For Criminal Code purposes a "human being" is
defined as one who has been born alive. Wis. STAT. § 939.22(16) (1983-84). By em-
ploying "death of another" language did the legislature intend the result element of the
homicide by intoxicated user statute to be broader than that of the other homicide laws
so as to include causing the death of certain unborn fetuses? The likelihood is that the
difference in terminology is the result of a drafting error.
79. Wis. STAT. § 940.25 (1983-84) provides in pertinent part:
1986]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
lels that of the general OMVWI statute and while, at first
glance, the former may appear to be but aggravated forms of
the latter, there are a variety of subtle differences which oper-
ate to distinguish the Criminal Code offenses from the general
OMVWI offense.
First, the homicide and felony injury crimes are enforcea-
ble without regard to whether the driver's conduct occurred
upon a highway or upon premises held out to the public for
motor vehicle usage."' The State of Wisconsin asserts its juris-
diction over these offenses to the same extent that it asserts
criminal jurisdiction generally."'
Second, the degree of intoxication which constitutes the
condition of "under the influence" for purposes of the Crimi-
nal Code offenses is statutorily defined as the material impair-
ment of one's ability to operate a vehicle.8 2 This standard
applies whether the source of the influence be an alcohol bev-
erage,8 3 a controlled substance, a combination of alcohol and a
controlled substance, a drug, or a combination of alcohol and
a drug. 4
Third, the homicide statute describes the prohibited act in
terms of "operation or handling" of a vehicle; the felony in-
jury statute employs only "operation" language. This conduct
terminology is not accompanied by legislative definition as is
(1) Any person who does either of the following under par. (a) or (b) is guilty
of a Class E felony:
(a) Causes great bodily harm to another human being by the operation of a
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant;
(b) Causes great bodily harm to another human being by the operation of a
vehicle while the person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1% or more by
weight of alcohol in that person's blood or 0.1 grams or more of alcohol in 210
liters of that person's breath.
80. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text for an analysis of the highway
limitation which is applicable to the general OMVWI offense.
81. See Wis. STAT. § 939.03 (1983-84).
82. Id. at § 939.22(42). This method of identifying the threshold of impairment by
definition of a standard should be compared with the lack of a statutorily established
standard in the general OMVWI offense. See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
83. It should be noted that Wis. STAT. § 939.22(42) (1983-84) makes specific refer-
ence to "alcohol" beverages as an influence source but does not contain the "intoxicant"
terminology of the general OMVWI offense. See supra note 39.
84. Wis. STAT. § 939.22(42) (1983-84). It should also be observed that this defini-
tion provision does not employ safe driving terminology for drug and combination alco-
hol-drug influences in the manner which the OMVWI statute does. See supra notes 56-
63 and accompanying text.
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the case with the OMVWI law.85 If the broad meaning of
"operate" is imported from the general OMVWI statute, it
would connote the physical manipulation or activation of any
of the controls of the vehicle necessary to put it in motion, but
would not require that the vehicle actually be in motion.86
This interpretation is permissible under principles of statutory
construction87 and is recommended in the interest of promot-
ing desirable uniformity among the several statutes dealing
with like subject matter.88
Finally, the homicide and felony injury statutes are distin-
guishable from OMVWI on the basis of the conveyances to
which the statutes apply. The definition of the term "vehicle"
for purposes of the Criminal Code89 is substantially broader
than the "motor vehicle" formulation applicable to the Vehi-
cle Code OMVWI offense.90
1. Homicide by Intoxicated User of a Vehicle
The crime of homicide by intoxicated user of a vehicle, as
presently defined, was enacted as part of the 1981-82 legisla-
85. ,vis. STAT. § 346.63(3) (1983-84) (precise definition of the terms "drive" and
"operate" for purposes of the OMVWI law).
86. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
87. The homicide and felony injury statutes are in pari materia with the general
OMVWI statute and they may be construed together. See, e.g., State v. WVachsmuth, 73
Wis. 2d 318, 325-26, 243 N.W.2d 410, 414-15 (1976); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra
note 72, § 10, at 78. This method of statutory construction seems especially appropriate
in view of the fact that all of these impaired driving statutes emanated from one legisla-
tive package. See 1981 Wis. Laws 20, amended by 1981 Wis. Laws 184. This is also the
approach utilized by the Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee in the uni-
form instructions for the homicide and felony injury offenses. Wis. JI-Criminal 1185,
1186, 1262, 1263 (1982).
88. Because the homicide and felony injury statutes involve the causation of speci-
fied harm, they are typically invoked in accident cases in which the evidence shows that
the actor's vehicle was actually in motion. This is not invariably the case, however.
Consider the situation in which an intoxicated driver is passed out behind the wheel
while the engine is running. The vehicle is in a traffic lane at a location just over the
crest of a hill. The vehicle is struck by an innocent driver who had no warning of the
danger and who is killed in the ensuing impact. If the broad OMVWI definition of
"operation" is utilized, it may be concluded that the intoxicated driver caused the death
by the "operation" of his vehicle.
89. Wis. STAT. § 939.22(44) (1983-84) provides the Criminal Code definition of
"vehicle" as follows: "'Vehicle' means any self-propelled device for moving persons or
property or pulling implements from one place to another, whether such device is oper-
ated on land, rails, water, or in the air."
90. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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tive package which reformulated Wisconsin's impaired driv-
ing statutes.91 Minor revisions since that time have for the
most part been cosmetic and have not altered the structure of
the crime's essential elements.
92
In State v. Caibaiosai the Wisconsin Supreme Court
identified the three elements of the present homicide statute:
(1) causing the death of another, (2) by the operation of a ve-
hicle, (3) while under the influence of an intoxicant or with a
concentration of blood alcohol equal to or exceeding the statu-
tory 0.10% limit.94 This configuration of the elements has
generated debate regarding the causation aspects of the crime
and the need to identify in a precise way the relationship
which must exist between the driver's conduct and condition
on one hand, and the death of the victim on the other. Some
insight into the present definition of this relationship may be
gleaned from an examination of the approach to this crime
which the legislature has taken in the past.
The elements of the current homicide law closely parallel
those of one of its predecessors. Section 340.271 of the 1953
Statutes prohibited what was termed "negligent homicide," an
offense which among its provisions imposed liability upon
"any person who by the operation of any vehicle while under
the influence of alcoholic beverages or narcotic drugs should
cause the death of another." 95 The statute was interpreted as
consisting of two essential elements: (1) that the driver of the
91. 1981 Wis. Laws 20, § 1817g, amended by 1981 Wis. Laws 184, § 7 and 1981
Wis. Laws 314, § 137.
92. Language in the statute relating to the various sources of influence has been
removed such that the meaning of "under the influence of an intoxicant" and the identi-
fication of the statutorily cognizable sources of influence must now be gleaned from the
general definitional statement in Wis. STAT. § 939.22(42) (1983-84), which is applicable
to the section 940.09 homicide offense. See 1983 Wis. Laws 459, § 25-26.
93. 122 Wis. 2d 587, 363 N.W.2d 574 (1985).
94. Id. at 593, 363 N.W.2d at 577. This formulation of the elements is consistent
with that employed in the pattern jury instruction for the crime. See Wis. JI-Criminal
1185-86 (1982).
95. The text of Wis. STAT. § 340.271(l) (1953) provided in pertinent part:
Any person who by operation of any vehicle while under the influence of
alcoholic beverages or narcotic drugs shall cause the death of another shall be
deemed guilty of negligent homicide and upon conviction thereof shall be pun-
ished by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 5 years nor less than
one year, or by imprisonment in the county jail not more than one year, or by
fine of not more than $2,500, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
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vehicle was under the influence of alcoholic beverages, and (2)
that the driver caused the death of another while operating the
vehicle. 96 In response to the argument that the law required
evidence that the operation of the vehicle was so affected by
the intoxication of the driver that it resulted in the victim's
death, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that driving while
intoxicated gave rise to an assumption that a causal relation-
ship existed between the intoxication and the death.97 "[T]o
require that facts be shown to prove that defendant's opera-
tion of the car was so affected by his intoxication that the acci-
dent would not have happened if he had been sober, would be
to impose an impossible burden on the state in the prosecution
of such a case."' 98 Contemporary commentary indicated that
the crime did not require proof of a causal connection between
the intoxication and the death.99
During the Criminal Code revision process of the 1950's
the Wisconsin Legislative Council proposed a formulation of
the homicide by intoxicated user offense which was essentially
the same as the prior statute: liability would have attached to
whomever "while under the influence of an intoxicant so oper-
ates a vehicle . . . as to cause the death of another human
being."" The offense as submitted would have been com-
prised of three elements: (1) operation of a vehicle, (2) in such
a manner as to cause the death of another, (3) while the driver
96. State v. Peckham, 263 Wis. 239, 242, 56 N.W.2d 835, 836 (1953).
97. State v. Resler, 262 Wis. 285, 290, 55 N.W.2d 35, 38 (1952).
98. Id. A similarly difficult burden is placed upon the defendant who wishes to
proffer an affirmative defense under present law. See infra notes 118-22 and accompa-
nying text.
99. V WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT ON
THE CRIMINAL CODE, at 65 (1953).
100. The full text submitted in 1953 by the Judiciary Committee of the Legislative
Council provided as follows:
340.06 Homicide By Intoxicated User Of Vehicle Or Firearm. (1) Whoever
while under the influence of an intoxicant so operates a vehicle or handles a
firearm as to cause the death of another human being may be fined not more
than $1000 or imprisoned not more than 2 years or both.
(2) The actor has a defense if it appears by a preponderance of the evidence
that the accident causing death would have been unavoidable even if he had not
been under the influence of an intoxicant. Proof by a preponderance of evidence
means that the trier of the fact must be persuaded that it is more probable than
not that the death would have occurred even if the actor had not been under the




was "under the influence." 10 1 In addition to this substantive
definition of the crime, the suggested legislation would also
have codified an affirmative defense to liability. The nature of
the defense required demonstrating, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the accident causing death would have been un-
avoidable even if the driver had not been under the influence
of an intoxicant. 02
The Council's published comments to the suggested revi-
sion indicate that the offense definition was a restatement of
the prior statute, 10 3 that it provided for a form of strict liabil-
ity, 104 and that it did not mandate affirmative proof of a causal
connection between the driver's intoxication and the victim's
death.10 5 The proposed affirmative defense was described as a
narrowing of the prior statute so as to relieve the defendant of
liability in the unavoidable accident situation in which even a
person with normal, "uninfluenced" reactive ability could not




The homicide statute ultimately enacted in 1955 as part of
a new Wisconsin Criminal Code was substantially different
from that suggested in 1953 by the Legislative Council. 10 7 It
101. Id.
102. An earlier proposed formulation of the affirmative defense would have relieved
the intoxicated driver of liability if the driver proved by a preponderance of the evidence
"that the death would have resulted even if he had been exercising due care and even if
he had not been under the influence of an intoxicant." VII WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL CODE, at 61 (1950).
103. V JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 99, at 65.
104. Strict liability can be justified on two grounds: (1) the fact that the causal
relation between the intoxication and the death is in many cases difficult or im-
possible to prove; and (2) the fact that such causal relation will, as a matter of
fact, be present in the great majority of cases even though it is impossible to
prove.
Id. at 64. These comments do not reflect an intent to relieve the state of proving a
causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the victim's death. Rather, the
proposed statute continued the tradition of not requiring proof of a causal link between
the intoxication and the death.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 64-65. The illustrative fact pattern provided in the Legislative Council's
commentary is the classic "dart out" scenario. Id.
107. The 1953 version of the statute, quoted at supra note 100, was actually passed
by the legislature as part of a new complete code of criminal law. 1953 Wis. Laws 623.
However, the effective date of the new code was delayed until 1955 because the legisla-
ture inserted a condition requiring that the code be reenacted during its 1955 session.
1953 Wis. Laws 623, § 282. In the interim, a Criminal Code Advisory Committee stud-
ied the code and ultimately reported out a new bill which, with some minor amend-
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conditioned liability upon proof that the actor caused the
death of another by the negligent operation of the vehicle and
while under the influence of an intoxicant. It specifically re-
quired evidence of causal negligence in addition to operation
while under the influence. 10  The element structure of the of-
fense and the proofs associated therewith 0 9 hence became sig-
nificantly more complex than it had been under prior law.' °
The prosecution was required to shoulder the additional bur-
den of demonstrating some type of causal negligence in addi-
tion to proving operation while under the influence of an
intoxicant.
The substantive nature of the crime of homicide by intoxi-
cated user as promulgated in 1955 survived until the 1981-82
revision of the state's impaired driving statutes. The repeal of
section 940.09 of the 1979 Wisconsin Statutes and the creation
of a new version of the statute reflect a return to history on the
part of the legislature. The substantive offense in its present
format is closely analogous to the 1953 version of section
340.271, l ' and the codification of a special affirmative defense
to liability represents an approach originally recommended by
the Legislative Council over thirty years ago.1
12
ments, was passed by the legislature with an effective date of July 1, 1956. 1955 Wis.
Laws 696. The homicide by intoxicated user statute finally enacted by the 1955 legisla-
ture was the product of the Advisory Committee. See Minutes of the Criminal Code
Advisory Committee (Mar. 20, 1954, April 29, 1954, and May 4, 1955). A brief history
of the development of the Wisconsin Criminal Code is recalled in Platz, The Criminal
Code, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 350, 350-53.
108. Wis. STAT. § 940.09 (1955) provided in full:
Whoever by the negligent operation of handling of a vehicle, firearm or
airgun and while under the influence of an intoxicant causes the death of another
may be fined not more than $2500 or imprisoned not more than 5 years or both.
No person shall be convicted under this section except upon proof of causal
negligence in addition to such operation or handling while under the influence of
an intoxicant.
109. The elements structure of section 940.09 was detailed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Bennett v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 727, 730, 196 N.W.2d 704, 705 (1972):
To warrant a conviction under this section the evidence must be established
to the requisite degree of proof: (1) That the defendant was the operator of a
vehicle involved; (2) that he was negligent in such operation; (3) that he was
under the influence of an intoxicant at the time of the accident; (4) that the
accident caused the death of another person; and (5) that his negligence was a
cause of the accident and resulting death.
110. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
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Substantively, the homicide statute no longer requires the
prosecution to establish causal negligence in addition to driv-
ing "under the influence". The supreme court in Caibaiosai
directly addressed the causation aspect of the present law and
the relationship which the conduct and condition of the driver
must have to the death of the victim. Identifying the act of
driving and the condition of being "under the influence" as
inseparable components of the "conduct" of the crime, the
court concluded that the offense is proven if a causal connec-
tion is shown to exist between that conduct and the death.1 1 3
The court held that the current statute "does not include
as an element of the crime a direct causal connection between
the fact of defendant's intoxication, conceptualized as an iso-
lated act, and the victim's death.""' 4
Under this statute there is an inherently dangerous activity
in which it is reasonably foreseeable that driving while intox-
icated may result in the death of an individual. The legisla-
ture has determined this activity so inherently dangerous
that proof of it need not require causal connection between
the defendant's intoxication and the death." 5
Accordingly, in a homicide by intoxicated user prosecu-
tion, the state must prove that the defendant's conduct, i.e.,
driving while "under the influence" or with a chemical con-
centration of blood alcohol equal to or in excess of the statu-
tory limit, was a substantial factor in producing the victim's
death." 6 The interpretation of the statute in Caibaiosai in no
way relieves the state of proving causation as an element of
the crime." 7 It does firmly establish, however, that no specific
113. Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d at 593-94, 363 N.W.2d at 577.
114. Id. at 594, 363 N.W.2d at 577.
115. Id. at 594, 363 N.W.2d at 577-78.
116. When causation of a specified harm is an element of a crime, the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct was a "substantial fac-
tor" in producing that harm. State v. Serebin, 119 Wis. 2d 837, 846-47, 350 N.W.2d 65,
71 (1984); Hart v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 371, 397, 249 N.W.2d 810, 822 (1977); Cranmore v.
State, 85 Wis. 2d 722, 775, 271 N.W.2d 402, 428 (Ct. App. 1978).
117. The court characterized driving while "under the influence" as negligence per
se. Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d at 595, 363 N.W.2d at 578. It also made reference to the
principles of strict liability. Id. However, under either theory, the evidence must still
establish a causal connection between the "negligent" conduct or the conduct to which




causal link need be established between the intoxication and
the death of the victim.
The reach of the statute, as interpreted in Caibaiosai, is
tempered in some measure by the statutorily provided affirma-
tive defense. If the defendant can show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the death would have occurred even if he
had not been "under the influence," liability for the homicide
may be avoided. The inclusion of this defense parallels the
approach suggested by the Legislative Council in 1953.118 At
that time, the Council thought it was fair to provide for such a
defense if the defendant's intoxication played no role in caus-
ing the death.119
The thrust of the affirmative defense in the present law ap-
pears to be similarly motivated, although it will have to be
reconciled with the construction of the substantive offense
provided in Caibaiosai. The court there interpreted the de-
fense as being operational when there is an "intervening
cause" between the defendant's conduct, i.e., driving "while
under the influence," and the victim's death.' 20 This construc-
tion goes beyond the language of the statute' 2' by including
both the impaired condition and the operation of the vehicle
as relevant ingredients in the formula for determining whether
the defendant should be relieved of liability.
122
118. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
119. V JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 99, at 64.
120. Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d at 596, 363 N.W.2d at 578.
121. Wis. STAT. § 940.09(2) (1983-84) expressly provides that the affirmative de-
fense is operational only if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that the death would have occurred even if he had not been "under the influence" or did
not have a blood alcohol concentration equal to or in excess of the statutory limit.
122. See Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d at 605 n.3, 363 N.W.2d at 583 n.3 (Abrahamson,
J., dissenting). The Caibalosai majority rejected the defendant's position that the affLirm-
ative defense is operational when the evidence shows that the defendant's conduct, as a
matter separate and distinct from his intoxication, caused the victim's death. Id. at 600,
363 N.W.2d at 580-81. The impact of this interpretation, which is consistent with the
court's construction of the substantive offense but inconsistent with the language of the
affirmative defense, is to effectively restrict the operation of the defense. Application of
the defense is limited to those situations in which the conduct of the defendant is not a
substantial factor in producing the death, but some extraneous agent or force does con-
stitute such a substantial factor.
In dissent Justice Abrahamson criticized the Caibafosai majority for failing to ex-
plain the circumstances in which the affirmative defense would be operational. Id. at
605 n.3, 363 N.W.2d at 583 n.3. (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). She further lamented
that the majority's interpretation would allow the following drivers to be convicted of
19861
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2. Felony Injury by Intoxicated Use of a Vehicle
The felony offense of injury by intoxicated use of a vehi-
cle 123 was originally enacted in 1977.124 In its initial form the
law prohibited the causation of great bodily harm to another
by the negligent operation of a vehicle while under the influ-
ence of an intoxicant. 125 The statute was designed to fil a void
in the structure of impaired driving offenses involving death
or injury. Prior to its enactment, any such prohibited conduct
resulting in an injury of whatever magnitude was punishable
only as a misdemeanor. 126 The new law responded to this in-
adequacy by providing penalties at the felony level when the
actor's conduct caused "great bodily harm," the misdemeanor
offense remaining in effect and applicable when the injury was
not as serious.
homicide by intoxicated user of vehicle: (1) the driver under the influence of an intoxi-
cant who kills a child who darts into the path of the driver's vehicle from between
parked cars; (2) the driver under the influence of an intoxicant who is stopped at a red
light and is rear-ended by another vehicle, the driver's passenger being killed in the
accident; (3) the driver under the influence of an intoxicant who stops at a red light and
who proceeds through the intersection after the light turns green whereupon the driver's
vehicle is struck by another motorist and the driver's passenger is killed; and (4) the
driver under the influence of an intoxicant who loses control of his motorcycle when it
skids on an oil slick and whose passenger is thereupon killed when she hits a tree. Id. at
603-04, 363 N.W.2d at 582.
It is submitted that in each of these scenarios the jury would have to be instructed
about criminal causation, the substantial factor test and the principle that there may be
more than one substantial factor which produces a death. Its task would thereafter be
similar to that which it is called upon to perform in other "cause in issue" criminal
cases. If the jury finds that the defendant's conduct (driving "under the influence")
under all of the circumstances was a substantial factor which produced the death, a
verdict of guilty is proper. On the other hand, if it finds that the defendant's conduct
was not a substantial factor in producing the death but that an extraneous factor, e.g.,
that the rear-ending driver or the darting child was the substantial factor causing the
death, then defendant should be acquitted of the homicide charge.
123. WIS. STAT. § 940.25 (1983-84). See supra note 79 for the text of the statute.
124. 1977 Wis. Laws 193, § 16, amended by 1977 Wis. Laws 272, § 88.
125. The full text of Wis. STAT. § 940.25 (1977) provided: "Whoever causes great
bodily harm to another human being by the negligent operation of a vehicle while under
the influence of an intoxicant is guilty of a Class E felony."
126. Wis. STAT. § 346.65(2)(1977) provided a penalty at the misdemeanor level for




The felony injury statute was completely revamped in the
1981-82 revisions of the impaired driving laws. 127 The crea-
tion of a new statute during that legislative process was neces-
sary in order to achieve symmetry between the design of this
law and that of its companion homicide, misdemeanor injury
and general OMVWI offenses.
The current felony injury statute is distinguishable from
the homicide law only by the degree of harm caused by the
actor. 128 Accordingly, the interpretation of the conduct ele-
ment and its relationship to the resulting harm which the
supreme court provided in the homicide context would be
equally applicable here.1 29 If the actor drives while in the im-
paired condition and such conduct thereby causes great bodily
harm to another, the actor commits the felony injury offense.
The affirmative defense to criminal liability, as interpreted in
the homicide context, is also available to the driver charged
with the felony injury violation.
1 30
C. Misdemeanor Injury by Intoxicated Use of a Vehicle
A specific provision of the general OMVWI statute ad-
dresses the situation in which one drives or operates a motor
vehicle while "under the influence" or with a chemical con-
centration of blood alcohol equal to or exceeding 0.10% by
weight and thereby causes injury to another. 131 The substan-
127. 1981 Wis. Laws 20, § 1817r, amended by 1981 Wis. Laws 184, § 8. Minor
revisions since the 1981-82 changes have been for the most part cosmetic. See 1983
Wis. Laws 459, § 27.
128. The result (injury) element of section 940.25 is phrased in terms of "great
bodily harm." This type of injury is defined at Wis. STAT. § 939.22(14) (1983-84):
"'Great bodily harm' means bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or
which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or pro-
tracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other
serious bodily injury."
129. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
130. Wxs. STAT. § 940.25(2) (1983-84). See supra notes 118-122 and accompany-
ing text.
131. Wis. STAT. § 346.63(2)(a)(1983-84) provides in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any person to cause injury to another person by the opera-
tion of a vehicle while:
1. Under the influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance or a combi-
nation of an intoxicant and a controlled substance, under the influence of any
other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or
1986]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
tive provisions of this misdemeanor offense 132 were revised
during the 1981-82 legislative sessions such that its organiza-
tion of elements roughly parallels those of the homicide, fel-
ony injury and the general OMVWI offenses. 133 Important
differences between the misdemeanor injury offense and its
companion homicide and felony injury crimes nonetheless ex-
ist as do some variations between misdemeanor injury and the
general OMVWI offenses.
When compared to the other crimes involving death or
bodily injury, the misdemeanor offense is distinguishable prin-
cipally on the basis of the degree of harm inflicted. Only "in-
jury" is required in the misdemeanor statute whereas death or
"great bodily harm" is required respectively by the homicide
or felony injury law. The Vehicle Code provides no definition
of "injury" which is specifically applicable to the misde-
meanor offense. In the absence of such a definition, the com-
mon and approved usage of a nontechnical term is presumed
to be the usage intended by the legislature. 134 Dictionary defi-
nitions of "injury" appear to parallel the meaning of "bodily
harm" as that term is used in the Criminal Code135 and gener-
ally indicate that the term connotes physical pain, illness or
impairment of physical condition. 
136
under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree
which renders him or her incapable of safely driving; or
2. The person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1% or more by weight
of alcohol in that person's blood or 0.1 grams or more of alcohol in 2 10 liters of
that person's breath.
132. A section 346.63(2)(a) violation is punishable by a maximum possible period
of incarceration of one year in the county jail. Wis. STAT. § 346.65(3)(1983-84). Be-
cause of the stated maximum length and place of imprisonment, the offense is classified
as a misdemeanor. See id. at §§ 939.60, 973.02.
133. 1981 Wis. Laws 20, § 1598t, amended by 1981 Wis. Laws 184, § 3. Since the
1981-82 session of the legislature, sections 346.63(2)(a)1 and (b) have been amended to
include drugs and the combination of intoxicants and drugs as cognizable sources of
impairment. 1983 Wis. Laws 459, § 12.
134. State v. Ehlenfeldt, 94 Wis. 2d 347, 356, 288 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1980).
135. Wis. STAT. § 939.22(4) (1983-84) defines "bodily harm" to mean "physical
pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition."
136. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has approved the use of dictionary defini-
tions to define "injury" in the context of this statute. State v. Winter, No. 84-2232-CR
(Wis. Ct. App. May 6, 1985) (unpublished opinion available on LExIs, Wisconsin liba-
rary, Cases file). In Winter, the trial court employed a general WEBSTER'S DICTION-
ARY definition ("injury" defined to mean "physical harm or damage to a person") and a
law dictionary definition ("injury" defined as "physical pain, illness or any impairment
of physical condition") to instruct the jury. The appellate court rejected the defense
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The difference in degree of harm aside, the misdemeanor
injury statute tracks its homicide and felony injury counter-
parts rather closely. It prohibits the causation of injury by
operation of a vehicle while "under the influence" or with a
concentration of blood alcohol equal to or in excess of the
statutory 0.10% limit.137 The causal relationship between the
actor's conduct (driving "under the influence"/". 10") and the
resulting injury should also be the same as that identified in
the homicide context. 138 These statutes were enacted together
and their identical language ought to be similarly con-
strued.1 39 Likewise, the defendant in a misdemeanor injury
prosecution has available the same affirmative defense which
is available in the homicide and felony injury contexts. 14°
Nonetheless, some important differences emerge between
the misdemeanor violation in the Vehicle Code and the homi-
cide and felony injury offenses in the Criminal Code. First,
the misdemeanor statute is enforceable only with reference to
vehicle operation which occurs upon highways or upon prem-
ises held out to the public for motor vehicle usage.1 41 Second,
the standard by which the condition of "under the influence"
is gauged, while identical with that employed in the general
OMVWI context,1 42 may be conceptually different from that
employed by the Criminal Code offenses.1 43 Third, the influ-
argument that the more stringent definition of injury which is applied in the "hit and
run" statute should also be applied to the misdemeanor injury law. Cf Wis. STAT.
§ 346.70(l)(1983-84) (defining "injury" in "hit and run" cases as "injury to a person of
a physical nature resulting in death or the need of first aid or attention by a physician or
surgeon, whether or not first aid or. medical or surgical treatment was actually
received").
137. See supra note 131.
138. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 87.
140. Wis. STAT. § 346.63(2)(b) (1983-84) provides:
[T]he actor has a defense if it appears by a preponderance of the evidence
that the injury would have occurred even if the actor had not been under the
influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance or a combination thereof,
under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her
incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and
any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving
or did not have a blood alcohol concentration described under par. (a)2.
141. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
142. Compare Wis. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a) (1983-84) with id. at § 346.63(2)(a)1.
143. In State v. Waalen, 125 Wis. 2d 272, 274, 371 N.W.2d 401, 402 (Ct. App.
1985), the court of appeals set forth a definition of "under the influence" as something
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ence described as "intoxicant" in the misdemeanor statute is
at variance with the "alcohol" limitation used in the Criminal
Code definition of "under the influence of an intoxicant."
144
Finally, the misdemeanor statute employs the term "vehicle"
which, in Vehicle Code usage, has a meaning which differs
from that ascribed to it in the Criminal Code.145
When the misdemeanor injury statute is compared and
contrasted with the general OMVWI offense, several similari-
ties and only a few differences surface. Both statutes proscribe
operation while "under the influence," a standard which is
couched in identical language in both provisions. Both laws
also contain a chemical offense. The principal distinctions be-
tween the two are found in the result (bodily injury) to which
the misdemeanor offense is directed and in the difference in
conveyances to which the statutes apply. 146
D. The "Not a Drop" Law
The most recent addition to Wisconsin's compendium of
impaired driving statutes is the so-called "not a drop" law.
1 4
1
Under penalty of suspension of the operating privilege, 148 no
less than the "material impairment" standard applied to the criminal offenses. See
supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
145. Compare Wis. STAT. § 340.01(74) (1983-84) with id. at § 939.22(44) at supra
note 89.
146. Compare id. § 340.01(35) with id. at 340.01(74).
The Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee has assumed that the use of
the term "vehicle" (as opposed to "motor vehicle") in section 346.63(2) was intentional
on the part of the legislature and justified by the fact that offenses involving injury are
considered to be more serious than those involving a general OMVWI violation. Wis.
JI-Criminal 2661 comment 1 (1982).
147. Wis. STAT. § 346.63(2m), amended by 1985 Wis. Laws 32 provides in perti-
nent part:
If a person has not attained the legal drinking age, as defined in s.
125.02(8m), the person may not drive or operate a motor vehicle while he or she
has a blood alcohol concentration of more than 0.0% but not more than 0.1%
by weight of alcohol in the person's blood or more than 0.0 grams but not more
than 0.1 grams of alcohol in 210 liters of that person's breath. The only penalty
for violation of this subsection is suspension of a person's operating privilege
under s. 343.30(lp).
148. WIS. STAT. § 34 3 .30(lp) (1983-84) mandates a three month suspension of op-
erating privileges upon conviction of a section 346.63(2m) violation. No other penalty
is provided for the offense. See also id. at § 343.305 (9)(em), created by 1985 Wis. Laws
32, § 1.
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person who has yet to attain the legal drinking age 49 may
drive or operate a motor vehicle upon a highway (or upon
premises held out to the public for motor vehicle usage) if that
person's blood alcohol concentration is greater than 0.0% by
weight but less than 0.10%.
If the driver's blood alcohol concentration equals or ex-
ceeds 0.10%, the driver may of course be subject to a general
OMVWI charge of driving while "under the influence" and/
or driving in violation of the 0.10% chemical offense. '50 Even
if the chemical test result is lower than 0.10%, an "under the
influence" prosecution may nonetheless be possible under ap-
propriate factual circumstances.
151
III. MULTIPLE CHARGE AND CONVICTION ISSUES IN
CASES OF IMPAIRED DRIVING
The complex of Wisconsin's impaired driving statutes, as
outlined above, presents several issues relative to charging, 152
convicting and ultimately sentencing a defendant on multiple
charges which may have arisen from one act of driving while
149. The "legal drinking age" in Wisconsin is statutorily set at 19 years of age.
Wis. STAT. § 125.02(8m) (1983-84). The original absolute sobriety session law, 1983
Wis. Laws 74, § 26x, was amended to reflect that its provisions were not applicable to
any person who had attained the age of eighteen years as of the law's effective date, July
1, 1984. 1983 Wis. Laws 521.
150. Homicide or injury prosecutions may also be commenced if the actor's con-
duct causes the harm specified by these statutes.
151. A prosecution of the driver with a blood alcohol level below .10% might be
commenced if other indicia of impairment evidence a condition of being "under the
influence." In such cases the evidentiary status of the blood alcohol test is governed by
the chemical test statute. See Wis. STAT. §§ 885.235(l)(a)-(b) (1983-84).
152. Certain limitations on prosecutor discretion were enacted as part of the 1981-
82 revisions of the impaired driving statutes. A district attorney or municipal prosecu-
tor who wishes to dismiss or amend any impaired driving offense must make application
to the court stating the reasons for any such proposal. The court may approve the
application of the prosecutor only if it finds that such amendment or dismissal would be
consistent with the public interest in deterring driving while "under the influence."
Wis. STAT. § 345.20(2)(c) (1983-84) (restriction applicable in OMVWI traffic forfeiture
actions); id. at § 967.055 (restriction applicable to cases of criminal OMVWI, homicide
by intoxicated user of vehicle, felony injury by intoxicated use of vehicle and misde-
meanor injury by driving "under the influence," as well as to section 343.305 "implied
consent" law violations). These provisions are consistent with the codified expression of
legislative intent to encourage vigorous prosecution of impaired driving offenses. Id. at
§ 967.055(l). But see State v. Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 347, 335 N.W.2d 354 (1983) (up-
holding trial court's discretionary decision to dismiss an implied consent charge upon
the defendant's plea of guilty to a companion OMVWI charge arising out of the same
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impaired. The application of the substantive law to situations
involving multiple victims or the alleged violation of multiple
incident). A bill which proposes to statutorily overrule Brooks has been introduced in
the Wisconsin Legislature. 1985 S.B. 299.
In a sense, the statutory provisions limiting prosecutor discretion to dismiss or
amend impaired driving offenses are consistent with the case law indicating that
prosecutorial discretion to terminate a pending prosecution is subject to the independent
authority of the trial court to grant or refuse a motion to dismiss "in the public inter-
est." State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 42-45, 270 N.W.2d 160, 162-64 (1978); Guinther
v. City of Milwaukee, 217 Wis. 334, 339, 258 N.W. 865, 867 (1935). See also State v.
Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d 569, 573-74, 297 N.W.2d 808, 810 (1980).
The impact of sections 345.20(2)(c) and 967.055 does not affect the initial charging
decision of the prosecutor. The broad discretion with which the government's attorney
is generally imbued at the charging stage is also applicable in cases of impaired driving.
See generally Braunsdorf, 98 Wis. 2d at 572, 297 N.W.2d at 260 ("Prosecutors enjoy
largely unfeterred discretion in the initiation of criminal proceedings."); State ex rel.
Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 378, 166 N.W.2d 255, 260 (1969) ("It is clear
that in his functions as a prosecutor he has great discretion in determining whether or
not to prosecute.").
In the exercise of this discretion the prosecutor is of course bound by standards of
professional responsibility. See, e.g., State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599, 608-10, 285




offense provisions poses problems of both constitutional 153 and
statutory1 5 4 concern.
153. The principal constitutional issue in the multiple charge context is one of
double jeopardy. The Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment has been held applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
The Wisconsin Constitution provides: "No person may be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law, and no person for the same offense may be
put twice in jeopardy of punishment, nor may be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself or herself." WIs. CONST. art. I, § 8(1).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the state and federal double jeopardy
protections are "identical in scope and purpose." Day v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 588, 591, 251
N.W.2d 811, 812-13 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 848 (1977); State v. Calhoun, 67 Wis.
2d 204, 220, 226 N.W.2d 504, 512 (1975). The Wisconsin appellate courts have accord-
ingly accepted, where applicable, the double jeopardy decisions of the United States
Supreme Court as governing the interpretation of the double jeopardy provision of the
state constitution. State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 61 n.7, 291 N.W.2d 809, 815 n.7
(1980); Harrell v. State, 88 Wis. 2d 546, 554, 277 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Ct. App. 1979).
But see State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 128-30, 369 N.W.2d 145, 158-59 (1985)
(Bablitch, J., dissenting).
The double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution has been construed to
afford several protections to the accused: "It protects against a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
154. Several statutory provisions also guide the analysis of multiple charge, convic-
tion and sentencing issues:
Wis. STAT. § 939.65 (1983-84) provides: "If an act forms the basis for a crime pun-
" ishable under more than one statutory provision, prosecution may proceed under any or
all such provisions." "This section states a rule of pleading, and does not purport to
state the limitations on multiple sentences for the same act or the limitations on multi-
ple convictions and subsequent prosecutions for the same act which may be included in
the constitutional double jeopardy rule." V JUDICIARY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra
note 99, at 52. The provision makes clear that there may be prosecution under multiple
sections of the Criminal Code for the same conduct. Id. See also Remington & Joseph,
Charging, Convicting and Sentencing The Multiple Criminal Offender, 1961 Wis. L.
REv. 528, 530-531. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has also indicated that under sec-
tion 939.65 the same act may form the basis for a crime punishable under more than
one statutory provision. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d at 611, 285 N.W.2d at 736 (1979). "We
do not construe the section [939.65] to mean the same crime, but different crimes having
some similar elements but not having identical elements." Id. at 611 n.14, 285 N.W.2d
at 736 n.14.
Wis. STAT. § 939.66 (1983-84) provides in pertinent part:
Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime
charged or an included crime, but not both. An included crime may be any of
the following:
(1) A crime which does not require proof of any fact in addition to those
which must be proved for the crime charged.
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A. Multiple Victim Cases
In some cases a single act of driving while "under the in-
fluence" causes multiple deaths and/or injuries to multiple
persons. The issue then becomes whether the driver is subject
to multiple charges and sentences for each person killed or
injured.
In State v. Rabe, 5' the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
confronted with the legal propriety of charging multiple homi-
cide offenses for deaths arising out of a single incident of im-
paired driving. The accused was alleged to have been driving
while "under the influence," to have driven through a stop
sign, and to have caused the deaths of four persons in the en-
suing accident. In the criminal information, the defendant
was charged with four homicide offenses contrary to the
homicide by intoxicated user statute then in effect.156 The ac-
cused claimed that this four-count information was multiplic-
itous157 and thereby offended the protections afforded to him
This subsection of section 939.66 states the general test for whether a particular
crime is statutorily included within another. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying
text.
Wis. STAT. § 939.71 (1983-84) provides:
If an act forms the basis for a crime punishable under more than one statutory
provision of this state or under a statutory provision of this state and the laws of
another jurisdiction, a conviction or acquittal on the merits under one provision
bars a subsequent prosecution under the other provision unless each provision
requires proof of a fact for conviction which the other does not require.
Section 939.71 operates to place a limitation on successive prosecutions when there
has been a previous conviction or acquittal on the merits for the same offense. It does
not address successive prosecutions when the previous litigation dealt with different
conduct by the defendant. Remington & Joseph, supra note 154, at 556. This section is
designed to prevent the harassment of the accused with subsequent prosecution for the
same crime without regard to whether the prior adjudication on the merits occurred
under the laws of Wisconsin or under the laws of another jurisdiction. V JUDICIARY
COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 99, at 55.
The test for determining whether an adjudication on the merits under one statute
bars a subsequent prosecution for the same conduct under another is identical to the test
used generally in the identification of lesser included crimes under section 939.66(1):
the offenses are the same unless each requires proof of a fact for conviction which the
other does not. See State v. Gordon, Ill Wis. 2d 133, 140-41, 330 N.W.2d 564, 567
(1983); State v. Elbaum, 54 Wis. 2d 213, 218, 194 N.W.2d 660, 663 (1972). See also
Schroeder v. State, 222 Wis. 251, 260-61, 267 N.W. 899, 903 (1936).
155. 96 Wis. 2d 48, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980).
156. Wis. STAT. § 940.09 (1977).
157. "Multiplicity arises where the defendant is charged in more than one count for
a single offense." Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 61, 291 N.W.2d at 815. The allegation in Rabe
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by the double jeopardy provisions of the federal and state
constitutions. 1
58
In evaluating this claim of multiplicitous charging by the
prosecutor, the court employed a two-pronged test to deter-
mine whether each death gave rise to a separate count of
homicide. In the first instance the issue was a double jeopardy
inquiry as to whether the four charged offenses were identical
in law and in fact. 159 Because the several counts involved vio-
lations of the same statute and were hence identical in law, the
focus of the analysis shifted to the determination of factual
identity among the charges. The court held that each homi-
cide count required proof of additional facts which the others
did not, i.e., the identity of the victim named in the particular
count as well as the causal relationship between the defend-
ant's conduct and the death of that particular victim. 60 This
factual dissimilarity among the several counts led the court to
resolve the double jeopardy aspects of the multiplicity attack
against the defendant.
The other prong of multiplicity analysis involves a deter-
mination of the legislature's intended "allowable unit of prose-
cution." 16' In the instance of homicide by intoxicated user of
a vehicle, the Rabe court found that the statute unambigu-
ously manifested a legislative intent to allow a separate prose-
cution for each death. The gravamen of the offense under the
statute then in existence was held to be more than just negli-
gent operation while "under the influence"; it involved proof
of a causal relationship between that conduct and the death of
each victim.1 62 Further, the court found that the placement of
the offense in the chapter of the Criminal Code defining
crimes against life and bodily security constituted additional
evidence that the legislature intended in the homicide by in-
was that the prosecution had, in effect, fractionalized but a single offense into four sepa-
rate homicide charges.
158. See supra note 153.
159. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 63, 291 N.W.2d at 816.
160. Id. at 66, 291 N.W.2d at 818. "In accord with the great weight of authority,
we hold that, where the crime is against persons rather than property, there are, as a
general rule, as many offenses as individuals affected." Id. at 68, 291 N.W.2d at 818.
See also Austin v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 213, 223, 271 N.W.2d 668, 672 (1978).
161. See Blenski v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 685, 694, 245 N.W. 2d 906, 911 (1976).
162. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 72-73, 291 N.W.2d at 821.
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toxicated user statute to protect lives and to permit a separate
charge for each life taken in violation thereof.
163
The homicide statute under scrutiny in Rabe was subse-
quently repealed and then recreated in its present form. It is
submitted, however, that a prosecution involving multiple
homicide charges arising out of a single act of driving "under
the influence" brought under present law ought to survive a
multiplicity attack when the analytical framework of the Rabe
decision is applied thereto. 164 With reference to the double
jeopardy prong of the analysis, each count of homicide contin-
ues to require proof of additional facts which the others do
not. The state continues to shoulder a burden of establishing
the separate identity of each victim and a causal relationship
between the conduct of the accused and the death of each
victim.
Application of the legislative intent test to identify the al-
lowable unit of prosecution also seems to compel a result con-
sistent with Rabe.1 65  The graveman of the charge under
present law continues to be something more than just driving
"under the influence"; there must be proof of the aforemen-
tioned causal connection with reference to each death. Fur-
ther, in the 1981-82 revision process, the legislature
maintained the placement of this homicide offense among the
other crimes affecting life and bodily security.1 66
163. Id. at 73-74, 291 N.W.2d at 821. The court pointed out, however, that its
holding did not mean that in every case of multiple deaths the prosecutor would neces-
sarily issue multiple counts or that the trial court would necessarily impose maximum
consecutive sentences. "By legally recognizing the right to charge multiple offenses
under sec. 940.09 where multiple deaths occur, prosecutorial and judicial discretion can
be exercised in a manner consistent with the context of the particular prosecution." Id.
at 76-77, 291 N.W.2d at 823. Rabe did not involve judicial review of the appropriate-
ness of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
164. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text. Of course, the analysis here
varies slightly from that articulated in Rabe because present law does not require proof
of negligence in addition to driving "under the influence."
165. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
166. There is certainly no indication that the legislature intended to statutorily
overrule Rabe when it subsequently revamped the impaired driving statutes. If any-
thing, its intent was to strengthen the law and to promote vigorous prosecution thereun-
der. See 1981 Wis. Laws 20, § 2051(13) (nonstatutory transportation provision),
amended by 1981 Wis. Laws 184, § 10.
The legislature has created sec. 940.09(1)(a), Stats., in a continuing effort to
keep drivers who are under the influence of intoxicants off the highway. It re-
flects the public's attitude and belief that such drivers are a sinister hazard per se
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The Rabe approach to analyzing multiplicity issues in
homicide cases and the court's decision upholding the filing of
multiple charges would also appear to be applicable if multiple
persons sustain injuries caused by the defendant's conduct of
driving while "under the influence." The requirement of addi-
tional factual proofs for each victim injured, the similarities
between the homicide statute on one hand and the felony and
misdemeanor injury statutes on the other, as well as the gen-
eral rule that there are as many offenses as victims when the
crime involved is one against persons, all operate to support
the position that multiple charges are also allowable in injury
cases involving more than one victim. 167
B. The "Under the Influence" - ".10" Combination of
Charges
With the exception of the "not a drop" law, 168 each of the
substantive offenses analyzed in the preceding discussion iden-
tifies multiple theories of driver liability. The conduct in
which one may not engage and from which serious conse-
quences may follow, if death or injury is caused, is statutorily
defined as operating either while "under the influence" or with
a chemical concentration of blood alcohol equal to or in ex-
cess of the. 10% threshold. If the prosecution has evidence in
support of both conditions of impairment, special procedural
provisions of the relevant statutes become operational.'69
These provisions permit the prosecutor to file multiple
counts alleging in the first instance that the operator drove
while "under the influence" and, in a second count, that the
and if death results from such operation, defendants may be properly found
guilty of the class D felony.
State v. Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d 587, 601, 363 N.W.2d 574, 581 (1985).
167. The argument that the legislature intends to allow multiple counts when there
are multiple victims of crimes against the person is slightly less compelling with refer-
ence to the misdemeanor injury statute. The latter offense is not codified among the
Criminal Code's "Crimes Against Life and Bodily Security," but instead has been
placed in the Vehicle Code. It is submitted, however, that this does not defeat the
conclusion in the accompanying text because location of the statute, while relevant, is
not of itself dispositive of the issue. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 73, 291 N.W.2d at 821. The
other components of the analysis support the position permitting the filing of multiple
charges in the misdemeanor context.
168. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
169. See Wis. STAT. §§ 346.63(1)(c), (2)(a)3 940.09(1)(c), 940.25(1)(c) (1983-84).
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driver violated the 0.10% chemical offense.17° If a decision is
made to file dual charges, the statutes mandate joinder of the
offenses for trial. While separate determinations of liability
would thereafter have to be made by the trier of fact, verdicts
of guilty on both offenses result in but one conviction for the
purposes of sentencing. 
171
The duality of charges made available by the statutes has
been subjected to double jeopardy attack; the claim is that the
filing of two charges violates a constitutional protection
against the imposition of multiple punishments for the same
offense. 172 Although the statutes permit but one conviction
for sentencing purposes, the argument has been made that a
conviction on both statutory bases of liability subjects the de-
fendant to multiple collateral consequences, such as the
stigma associated with multiple convictions, the use of multi-
ple prior convictions at a subsequent sentencing proceeding,
and the possibility of impeachment with multiple prior con-
victions should the defendant testify in some future matter. 173
The issue was resolved by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
State v. Bohacheff,74 wherein it held that the legislature in-
tended that the dual theories of liability give rise to but one
conviction for all purposes, even if a guilty verdict is returned
on both counts.17 5 Support for this position was found in the
singularity of purpose to which each of the impaired statutes
is directed, in the inappropriateness of imposing multiple pun-
ishments when the actor has committed one offense but has
done so in two ways, and in the evident legislative purpose to
170. "The duality of prosecution theories] represents a new approach to the serious
problem of drinking and driving. It was apparently intended to make it easier for the
state to convict a defendant for drinking and driving by broadening the bases for liabil-
ity." State v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 402, 414, 338 N.W.2d 466, 472 (1983).
171. The action which is taken against the operator's license upon conviction is
treated at Wis. STAT. § 343.30(Iq) (1983-84).
172. See supra note 153. Because of the mandatory joinder provisions requiring
that both theories of liability be tried together, the only double jeopardy protection
which pertains is that prohibiting multiple punishments for the same offense.
173. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d at 409, 338 N.W.2d at 469-70.
174. 114 Wis. 2d 402, 338 N.W.2d 466 (1983).
175. Id. at 413, 338 N.W.2d at 471-72. Because the court found that dual theory
prosecutions generate but one conviction if the prosecution prevails on both counts, it
was unnecessary to reach the state's alternative argument that the federal double jeop-
ardy clause would not be violated by the imposition of separate punishments for each
count. Id. at 408 n.6, 338 N.W.2d at 469 n.6.
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facilitate prosecution which motivated the dual theory
approach. 176
The Bohacheff case involved a criminal prosecution
wherein dual theories of liability were alleged under the felony
injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle statute. Because this law
was one of a series of impaired driving statutes enacted to-
gether in the 1981-82 revision process and because each of the
substantive offenses contains virtually identical language rela-
tive to the availability of dual prosecution theories giving rise
to but a single sentence, it is submitted that the Bohacheff con-
clusion rejecting the double jeopardy attack and holding that
dual guilty verdicts give rise to but one conviction for all pur-
poses is also applicable to the homicide, misdemeanor injury
and the general OMVWI statutes.
177
C. The Combination of an OMVWI Charge with a
Homicide or Injury Offense
The intoxicated driver whose conduct subjects him to
prosecution for homicide, felony injury or misdemeanor in-
jury may, by that very same conduct, also violate the general
OMVWI law. 78 The issue then arises whether he may there-
after be prosecuted, convicted and sentenced for the death or
injury offense as well as for the OMVWI violation.
176. Id. at 414-17, 338 N.W.2d at 472-73.
177. In a series of unpublished opinions the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has held
Bohacheff to be applicable to several of the impaired driving statutes. See In the Inter-
est of T.L.R., No. 83-1586-LV (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1984) (unpublished opinion avail-
able on LEXIS, Wisconsin library, Cases file) (Bohacheff applicable to homicide by
intoxicated user statute); State v. Haendel, No. 83-385-CR (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 20,
1983) (unpublished opinion available on LEXIS, Wisconsin library, Cases file)
(Bohacheff applicable to criminal prosecutions under the general OMVWI law). See
also County of Ozaukee v. Berg, Nos. 84-1175 and 84-1208 (Wis. Ct. App. June 19,
1985) (unpublished opinion available on LEXIS, Wisconsin library, Cases file) (declin-
ing to apply the double jeopardy clause to dual theory OMVWI prosecutions which are
civil in nature); City of Muskego v. Stengel, No. 84-1139 (vis. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 1985)
(unpublished opinion available on LEXIS, Wisconsin library, Cases file) (prosecution of
both civil OMVWI offense and civil ".10" offense not barred by double jeopardy
principles).
178. The commission of a homicide or injury offense by impaired driving does not
invariably involve a violation of the general OMVWI law, although it usually does. See
infra note 190 and accompanying text.
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In one context the resolution of this issue has been clearly
determined. If the OMVWI offense is civil in nature,
179
double jeopardy principles do not prohibit prosecution of both
the criminal homicide or injury offense and the civil traffic
OMVWI violation. The Wisconsin appellate courts have con-
sistently interpreted the relevant double jeopardy doctrine to
protect against two attempted criminal prosecutions for the
same offense.180 That doctrine is not offended when the multi-
ple prosecutions consist of a mixture of a criminal proceding
(homicide, felony injury or misdemeanor injury by intoxicated
use of a vehicle) and a civil proceeding resulting in a remedial
penalty (civil OMVWI).' 8 '
If the general OMVWI offense is criminal in nature,'82 it
appears in the first instance that Wisconsin procedural stat-
utes permit the filing of a criminal OMVWI charge in addi-
tion to a homicide or injury charge.18 3 As a general rule, an
act punishable under more than one provision of the statutes
may be prosecuted under any or all such provisions.'84 This
rule of pleading, however, does not resolve the multiplicity is-
sue of whether such multiple charges impermissibly fraction-
alize a single offense into several counts.
179. Wis. STAT. § 346.65(2) (1983-84) establishes the penalty structure for the gen-
eral OMVWI offense. The first violation of the statute, or a municipal ordinance in
conformity therewith, is punishable only by imposition of a money forfeiture. The Wis-
consin appellate courts have consistently characterized this as a civil offense, the penalty
for which is remedial in nature. State v. Folk, 117 Wis. 2d 42, 47, 342 N.W.2d 761, 764
(Wis. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Schulz, 100 Wis. 2d 329, 330-31, 302 N.W.2d 59, 60-61
(Wis. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663, 672-73, 298 N.W.2d 196, 202
(Wis. Ct. App. 1980). See also Wis. STAT. § 939.12 (1983-84) (conduct punishable only
by a forfeiture not a crime). Second and subsequent violations of the general OMVWI
law within the time limits established by statute are criminal in nature, i.e., punishable
by both a fine and imprisonment. Id. at § 346.65(2). Crime is defined as conduct pro-
hibited by state law and punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. Id. at § 939.12.
180. See, e.g., State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 108-09, 369 N.W.2d 145, 148
(1985); Schulz, 100 Wis. 2d at 330, 302 N.W.2d at 60.
181. Folk, 117 Wis. 2d at 47, 342 N.W.2d at 763-64; Schulz, 100 Wis. 2d at 330-32,
302 N.W.2d at 60-61. Both of these cases involved a civil OMVWI prosecution in addi-
tion to a homicide by intoxicated user prosecution. The rationale of the cases compels a
similar result when a civil OMVWI violation is prosecuted in addition to a felony or
misdemeanor injury by intoxicated user of vehicle charge.
182. See supra note 179.
183. Wis. STAT. § 939.65 (1983-84). This provision is applicable without regard to
whether all charged offenses are codified within the Criminal Code. WIS. STAT.
§ 939.20 (1983-84).
184. Wis. STAT. § 939.65 (1983-84).
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An initial consideration in the analysis of the problem is
whether the multiple offenses are the "same" for double jeop-
ardy purposes. 1 5  The standard test by which legislative in-
tent is gauged and by which this assessment is made involves a
determination of whether each offense requires proof of a fact
for conviction which the other does not.18 6 If this standard of
dissimilarity is satisfied, then the crimes are considered suffi-
ciently distinguishable to support separate convictions and
punishments.
187
Traditional double jeopardy analysis presumptively per-
mits multiple convictions and punishments unless the "addi-
tional fact" test discussed above mandates a conclusion that
the charges are identical or that they occupy a greater inclu-
sive-lesser included crime relationship. If the offenses are
identical in law and in fact or if one offense is statutorily in-
cluded within the other, the accused may not be convicted of
both, in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intent to
the contrary.1
88
185. This approach of initially analyzing the "sameness" of the offenses before con-
sidering legislative intent as to the allowable unit of prosecution tracks the method cur-
rently employed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. See State v. Tappa, No. 84-131-CR,
slip op. at 7-8 (Dec. 19, 1985). In response to the emerging primacy of legislative intent
in relevant double jeopardy analysis, the United States Supreme Court currently ap-
proaches these issues in the opposite order. See Garrett v. United States, 105 S. Ct.
2407, 2411-20 (1985).
186. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977); Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); State v. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d 133, 140-41, 330 N.W.2d 564,
567 (1983); State v. Ramirez, 83 'Wis. 2d 150, 153-56, 265 N.W.2d 274, 276-77 (1978);
Schroeder v. State, 222 Wis. 251, 260-61, 267 N.W. 899, 903 (1936); see also Wis.
STAT. §§ 939.66(1), 939.71 (1983-84).
The "additional fact" or "additional element" test is designed to identify whether
multiple convictions were intended by the legislature. Whalen v. United States, 445
U.S. 684, 691 (1980); Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d at 140-42, 330 N.W.2d at 567-68.
In Wisconsin the test for double jeopardy identification of "same offenses" has also
been phrased in terms of whether the two offenses are the same in law and in fact.
Ramirez, 83 Wis. 2d at 154, 265 N.W.2d at 276; State v. Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d 754,
757-58, 242 N.W.2d 206, 208 (1976).
187. Brown, 432 U.S. at 166.
188. If the offenses are the same in law and in fact, they are the "same offense" for
double jeopardy purposes. State v. Stevens, 123 Wis. 2d 303, 320-23, 367 N.W.2d 788,
797-98 (1985). If they occupy a relationship of greater inclusive-lesser included crimes,
they are also the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes because the lesser offense
requires no proof beyond that required for conviction on the greater inclusive crime.
Id. In the latter context, Wis. STAT. § 939.66(l) (1983-84) specifically prohibits multi-
ple convictions in language clearly indicative of legislative intent. The test embodied in
1986]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
If a criminal OMVWI count is attached to a homicide,
felony injury, or misdemeanor injury by intoxicated use of ve-
hicle charge, the position may be advanced that the multiple
offenses are not the same in law and in fact and that the homi-
cide and injury crimes are not greater inclusive offenses of
criminal OMVWI. Applying the strict "elements only" ap-
proach in the identification of lesser included offenses to
which the Wisconsin Supreme Court has repeatedly demon-
strated its firm commitment, 189 it may be concluded that each
offense requires proof of a fact for conviction which the other
does not, that criminal OMVWI is not statutorily included
within the homicide or injury offenses, and that it is entirely
possible to commit homicide, felony injury, or misdemeanor
injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle without simultaneously
committing criminal OMVWI.190 Accordingly, in the single
this statute for determining whether one crime is included within another is the "addi-
tional fact" inquiry discussed in the accompanying text.
189. This court is committed to the "elements only" analysis of whether one
offense is included within another. The test focuses not on the peculiar factual
nature of a given defendant's criminal activity, but on whether the lesser offense
is statutorily within the greater. . . . Stated in other words, an offense is a
"lesser included" one only if all of its statutory elements can be demonstrated
without proof of any fact or element in addition to those which must be proved
for the "greater" offense. . . . Conversely, an offense is not a lesser-included
one if it contains an additional statutory element. This court has stated this test
often and clearly.. . . In Randolph, the court additionally capsulized the rule by
the formulation that "for one crime to be included in another it must be 'utterly
impossible' to commit the greater without committing the lesser.
Hagenkord v. State, 100 Wis. 2d 452, 481, 302 N.W.2d 421, 436 (1981) (citations omit-
ted). See also State v. Richards, 123 Wis. 2d 1, 5-7, 365 N.W.2d 7, 9 (1985). For the
United States Supreme Court's treatment of this issue see United States v. Woodward,
105 S. Ct. 611 (1985) (per curiam); Thigpen v. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. 2916, 2922-23 (1984)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975).
190. A few examples demonstrate the point. If the actor's conduct of driving while
impaired causes the death of another and the incident occurs on property not open to
the public for motor vehicle usage, the driver is liable for felony homicide, but the driver
has not committed the general OMVWI offense because the latter has no applicability
on purely private property. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
Further, each offense requires proof of a fact for conviction which the other does
not. Homicide, of course, mandates proof of death caused by the defendant's conduct.
Criminal OMVWI requires proof of operation upon a highway or upon premises held
out to the public for motor vehicle usage.
In another scenario the actor drives a bicycle upon a highway while "under the
influence" and the actor's conduct causes injury to another. Under these facts the actor
has committed the misdemeanor injury by intoxicated use offense. This statute applies
to the operation of "vehicles," a term of art which includes conveyances which are not
self-propelled. See supra note 25. However, the actor has not committed a general
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trial situation, the present offense definitions of these crimes
appear to allow multiple convictions and punishments in a
manner which is consistent with the defendant's double jeop-
ardy protections.
Double jeopardy doctrine and relevant statutes also appear
to permit multiple successive trials for a homicide or injury
offense as well as for a criminal OMVWI offense. The same
"additional fact" test is used to determine whether the of-
fenses are sufficiently distinguishable to allow successive pros-
ecutions. 191 If the first trial results in a conviction, double
jeopardy principles permit a second prosecution because the
offenses are not the "same" in double jeopardy law. However,
if the earlier of the two prosecutions results in an acquittal, a
second trial may be banned by the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel even if the two offenses are not the "same" for double jeop-
ardy purposes.
192
The discussion of the multiplicity issue relative to charging
criminal OMVWI in addition to homicide or injury offense
has thus far been limited to the double jeopardy aspects of the
problem. The other prong of multiplicity analysis is focused
upon the legislature's intended allowable unit of prosecution
when such multiple violations emanate from a single incident
of impaired driving.
Strong arguments yielding contrary conclusions suggest
the need for legislative clarification relative to the intended
prosecution unit. Support for multiple charges and punish-
ments may be found within the very definitions of the offenses.
Because criminal OMVWI on the one hand and the homicide
and injury offenses on the other each require proof of a fact
for conviction which the other does not, the statutes proscribe
OMVWI offense because the latter statute applies only to the driving or operation of
"motor vehicles," a class of conveyances limited by definition to those which are self-
propelled. See supra note 25.
191. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d at 140-42, 330 N.W.2d at 567-68; Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 64
n.8, 291 N.W.2d at 817 n.8; Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d at 758, 242 N.W.2d at 208.
192. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is embodied within the federal double jeop-
ardy clause and operates to prohibit relitigation of facts which have already been estab-
lished against the government. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Kramsvogel,
124 Wis. 2d at 122, 369 N.W.2d at 155.
If, for example, it were clear that the jury in the first trial found that the defendant
was not the driver, the state is collaterally estopped from proceeding to a second trial on
the companion charge in which this matter would be in issue again.
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separate offenses to which attends a presumption of legislative
intent to allow multiple punishments. 193 Further evidence of
this intent may be found in the placement of the several of-
fenses in separate statutory provisions and, in some instances,
in entirely different codes. 194
However, it may be submitted that all of the impaired
driving offenses are targeted at the same dangerous behav-
ior,195 that the nature of the proscribed conduct is essentially
the same, 196 that the offenses are distinguishable principally on
the basis of harm inflicted, and that it would accordingly be
inappropriate to assess the variety of penalties attached to
each of the multiple offenses when they all arise out of a single
incident. 1
97
The comparable strength of these two contrary positions
relative to the unit of prosecution issue ought to command
legislative attention to the problem. While the current struc-
ture of the statutes leads to the conclusion that criminal
193. State v. Haskins, No. 85-759-CR (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1985) (unpublished
opinion available on LEXIS, Wisconsin library, Cases file).
This presumption may be overcome if there is a clear indication of contrary legisla-
tive intent. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 367 (1983). In Wisconsin the legislature
has spoken to the point in a general way by prohibiting multiple prosecutions and the
imposition of multiple punishments unless each of the several offenses is sufficiently
distinguishable as determined by the application of the additional fact test. Gordon, 111
Wis. 2d at 140-42, 330 N.W.2d at 567-68. See also WIS. STAT. §§ 939.66(1), 939.71
(1983-84). The element structure of criminal OMVWI as devised by the legislature is
sufficiently distinguishable from that of the homicide and injury offenses to yield the
conclusion that the lawmakers intended to allow multiple convictions and punishments.
It may also be observed that in the penalty section attached to the general OMVWI
offense, the legislature appears to recognize the possibility that multiple convictions may
arise from a single incident of impaired driving. Wis. STAT. §§ 346.65 (2)(b)-(c) (1983-
84).
194. See Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 73, 291 N.W.2d at 821. The court therein appeared to
recognize a divergence in legislative purpose when it placed some impaired driving
crimes in the Criminal Code's chapter of offenses involving life and bodily security and
located others in the Vehicle Code. The former action indicates an intent to protect
lives and the latter reflects a purpose to deter impaired individuals from driving. Id.
This method of placement may be urged in support of the conclusion that a criminal
OMVWI charge (Vehicle Code offense) may be pressed in addition to a homicide or
felony injury offense (Criminal Code violation), but it makes the argument in support of
the permissibility of linking a criminal OMVWI charge with a misdemeanor injury of-
fense (both Vehicle Code violations) less compelling.
195. See Woodward, 105 S. Ct. at 613; Ablernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333
(1981).




OMVWI is not a lesser included offense of the homicide and
injury crimes,198 it remains unclear whether it may be prose-
cuted in addition to those more serious offenses.
D. The Relationship of the Injury Offenses
The felony and misdemeanor injury by intoxicated use of a
vehicle offenses are distinguishable principally by the degree
of bodily harm suffered by the victim of the actor's conduct. 199
However, under the present formulation of these two offenses,
the misdemeanor crime does not appear to be statutorily in-
cluded within the felony injury law. Again, applying the strict
"elements only" test,200 it is entirely possible to commit the
crime of felony injury without also committing the misde-
meanor injury offense by the same conduct.20 1 Accordingly,
in a felony injury prosecution in which the dispute focuses at
least in part upon whether the injuries suffered constitute
"great bodily harm" (the felony standard), it would be imper-
missible to submit to the jury the option of finding the defend-
ant guilty of a misdemeanor injury violation (which requires
only "injury") because the latter offense is not statutorily in-
cluded within the former.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The configuration of offenses in Wisconsin's scheme of im-
paired driving statutes reflects a legislative purpose to deal in a
comprehensive manner with a dangerous problem and the
harm which it visits upon others. However, when the various
offense definitions are critically examined, several suggestions
emerge which, if implemented, would promote desirable clar-
198. See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
201. The scenario of impaired driving causing injury which occurs on purely pri-
vate property not open to the public for motor vehicle usage demonstrates the position
that it is entirely possible to commit the felony injury offense without simultaneously
violating the misdemeanor injury law. The intoxicated driver who causes great bodily
harm while driving on purely private property commits the felony injury offense. This
driver does not, however, offend the misdemeanor injury statute because the latter pro-
vision is limited in enforceability to highway driving or driving which occurs on private
property open to the public for motor vehicle usage. Wis. STAT. § 346.61 (1983-84).
See also supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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ity, uniformity and simplicity among statutes designed to ad-
dress the same fundamental problem.
First, there ought to be a uniform definition of the degree
of impairment which constitutes the condition of being
"under the influence." If the court of appeals was correct in
the Waalen case,2 °2 it may be concluded that Wisconsin law
presently contains three different standards of impairment:
(1) "material impairment of ability to operate a vehicle,"
which is applicable to the homicide and felony injury of-
fense;203 (2) any abnormal mental or physical condition in
which one is deprived of that clearness of intellect and self-
control which he or she would otherwise possess, which the
court of appeals indicated is the standard applicable to the
general OMVWI offense and, by implication, to the misde-
meanor injury statute, if the source of influence is an intoxi-
cant, a controlled substance, or a combination of the two;
2°4
and (3) "under the influence to a degree which renders [the
driver or operator] incapable of safely driving," which is ap-
plicable to the general OMVWI and misdemeanor injury stat-
utes if the source of the influence is a drug or a combination of
an intoxicant and a drug.205 If the hypothesis is sound that
each of the impaired driving statutes is designed to respond to
a common hazard and that the principal distinction among
the offenses is one which is measured by the degree of harm
inflicted by the prohibited conduct, then it is urged that the
threshold of impairment beyond which one may not drive or
operate a vehicle ought to be the same.20 6 A uniform defini-
tion of the "under the influence" condition should be applica-
ble throughout the entire scheme of impaired driving offenses
202. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
206. If a preference may be expressed, it is for the standard approved for the gen-
eral OMVWI offense by the court of appeals in State v. Waalen, 125 Wis. 2d 272, 371
N.W.2d 401 (Ct. App. 1985). Indulgence in any of the various sources of influence or a
combination thereof which deprives the driver of the clarity of intellect and self-control
which otherwise would be possessed constitutes a test which the jury is capable of un-
derstanding and applying. It also eliminates the risk of jury confusion inherent in the
"material impairment of ability to drive" and "incapable of safely driving" tests. In the
latter instances the trier of fact may become confused by the very definition of the stan-
dard and mistakenly believe that the impaired condition must be evidenced by impaired
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(except, of course, in the "not a drop" law) and throughout
the entire range of the statutorily recognized sources of influ-
ence. A standardized approach would achieve the same sym-
metry in the "under the influence" theory of liability that now
exists among the various offenses in the ".10" theory of
liability.
Second, the statutorily recognized sources of influence
ought to be made uniform throughout the impaired driving
statutes. A variance now exists between the classification of
influences employed in the Criminal Code and that utilized in
the Vehicle Code.20 7 Again, desirable symmetry would be
achieved by a designation of influence sources which would be
applicable throughout the system of relevant offenses.
Third, the precise definitions of "drive" and "operate,"
which are codified in the general OMVWI and misdemeanor
injury statutes, ought to be incorporated in the homicide and
felony injury laws. The latter statutes employ "operation or
handling" 20 8 and "operation" 20 9 language, respectively, and
do so without the benefit of definition. This statutory silence
raises the issue whether the broad meaning of "operate" em-
ployed in the Vehicle Code2 10 is also applicable to the homi-
cide and felony injury offenses. Earlier discussion suggested
that death or great bodily harm may indeed be caused by con-
duct which involves manipulation of the controls of a motor
vehicle necessary to put it in motion (the OMVWI definition
of "operate")211 but which does not involve actual movement
of the impaired driver's vehicle at the time of the accident. If
the Vehicle Code definition of "operate" is incorporated into
the relevant Criminal Code offenses, then the causation of
or unsafe operation. The standard suggested is essentially the same as that employed in
several jurisdictions. See 1 R. ERWiN, supra note 39, § 1.04[2][a].
If the Wisconsin Supreme Court reverses the court of appeals in Waalen and holds
that the threshold of "influence" is uniform throughout the impaired driving statutes
and is in fact the Criminal Code's "material impairment of ability to drive" standard,
then the establishment of the lesser threshold recommended above would require legis-
lative action.
207. The Criminal Code classification system employs "alcohol" language whereas
the Vehicle Code uses the term "intoxicant." The position has been taken that the latter
term is arguably broader than the former. See supra note 35.
208. See supra note 77.
209. See supra note 79.
210. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 88.
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death or great bodily harm by impaired "operation" would
clearly (and desirably) be prosecutable as homicide or felony
injury.
Fourth, the legislature ought to consider revising the lan-
guage in which it has couched the affirmative defense to liabil-
ity in the homicide and injury statutes. Assuming that it
wishes to preserve the interpretation of the defense as devel-
oped in Caibaiosai,21 z a change in the terminology of the de-
fense could promote clarity and incorporate the gloss of
judicial interpretation which has been applied to the existing
formulation. 13 If the true thrust of the defense is one which
relieves the defendant of liability when there is an extraneous
force which is the substantial factor causing the victim's death
214 ior injury, and if both the driving and the impaired condi-
tion of the defendant must be figured into the causation
formula as well as into the application of the affirmative de-
fense, then perhaps the structure of the defense initially pro-
posed by the Legislative Council in 1950 ought to be
reconsidered. The latter formulation provided a defense "if
the actor proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the
death would have resulted even if he had been exercising due
care and even if he had not been under the influence of an
intoxicant. ' 215 It is submitted that this method of phrasing
the defense would facilitate the identification of those situa-
tions in which it is operational.
Fifth, attention ought to be given to the unit of prosecu-
tion which is allowable when a single act of impaired driving
constitutes both a criminal OMVWI violation as well as a
homicide or injury by intoxicated use of vehicle offense. The
structure of the several statutes seems to allow the prosecution
of multiple criminal charges in this context as well as the im-
position of multiple punishments when traditional double
jeopardy analysis is applied to the problem. 216 However, the
key issue of the legislatively intended allowable unit of prose-
212. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
213. There is a variance between the language of the defense and the interpretation
which has been accorded to it. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
215. VII JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 102, at 61 (emphasis
supplied).
216. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
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cution is subject to contrary resolutions each supported by
strong arguments. 17 It would indeed be preferable for the
legislature to pointedly address the problem rather than leav-
ing its ultimate determination to presumptions and other
methods of discerning legislative intent.
Finally, the misdemeanor injury statute should be repealed
and recreated as part of the Criminal Code with a Class A
misdemeanor designation.21 8 This would promote two desira-
ble results: (1) it would make the misdemeanor injury statute
enforceable without regard to whether the actor's driving or
operating occurred on a highway or upon private premises
held out to the public for motor vehicle usage,21 9 and (2) it
would clearly establish the misdemeanor injury offense as a
lesser included crime of felony injury and thereby allow for its
submission to the jury when there is a legitimate dispute as to
whether the defendant's conduct caused the "great bodily
harm" required for a felony conviction.2
The current system of impaired driving offenses in Wis-
consin constitutes the state's most comprehensive legislative
package to date in its unending endeavor to formulate offense
definitions in a clear and precise way. A critical study of these
definitions, however, suggests a present need for greater clar-
ity and precision. The recommendations advanced in this dis-
cussion are intended to promote these goals.
217. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
218. The Class A misdemeanor designation would make the maximum penalty a
fine not to exceed $10,000, or imprisonment not to exceed nine months, or both. Wis.
STAT. § 939.51(3)(a) (1983-84). This classification would properly locate the misde-
meanor injury statute in the continuum of the homicide and injury offenses. Homicide
by intoxicated user of a vehicle is a Class D felony and felony injury is a Class E felony.
In Wisconsin's scheme of penalties, the Class A misdemeanors are directly below the
Class E felonies.
219. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. The misdemeanor injury offense
ought to be enforceable to the same extent as the homicide and felony injury crimes.
The highway limitation upon this offense serves no legitimate purpose.
220. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
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